Securing Technological Leadership? The Cost of Export Controls on Firms
Co-authors: Lina Han, Marco MacchiavelliAndré Silva, February 2025
CEPR & Kiel Institute Geonomics Conference 2023 · 2024 Bocconi Geonomics Workshop · 2024 GCAP Annual Conference (Columbia)
Paper · Liberty Street · BibTeX

FT · Bloomberg · NYT · CFR · CSIS · Barron’s · Marginal Revolution

AbstractTo safeguard its technological leadership, the U.S. has restricted domestic suppliers from exporting specific cutting-edge technologies to selected Chinese firms. Domestic firms affected by these export controls halt sales to Chinese customers, as intended, but struggle to establish new relations with alternative customers domestically or in politically aligned regions. As a result, domestic suppliers experience a $130 billion decline in market capitalization, along with reductions in profitability, employment, and bank lending. We also show how Chinese firms strategically respond to export controls. Overall, export controls impose significant costs on domestic firms producing the very technologies these policies intend to protect.

Extend-and-Pretend in the U.S. CRE Market
Co-author: Saketh Prazad, October 2024
Paper · BibTeX
FT [1][2][3] · Bloomberg [Odd Lots] [Business Week] · CoStar · 
Reuters
SFS Cavalcade 2025 · NBER Financial Market Risks 2025 · FIRS 2025 · Mitsui Symposium 2025

Abstract: We show that banks “extended-and-pretended” their impaired CRE mortgages in the post-pandemic period to avoid writing off their capital, leading to credit misallocation and a buildup of financial fragility. We detect this behavior using loan-level supervisory data on maturity extensions, bank assessment of credit risk, and realized defaults for loans to property owners and REITs. Extend-and-pretend crowds out new credit provision, leading to a 4.8–5.3% drop in CRE mortgage origination since 2022:Q1 and fuels the amount of CRE mortgages maturing in the near term. As of 2023:Q4, this “maturity wall” represents 27% of bank capital.

Stakeholders’ Aversion to Inequality and Bank Lending to Minorities
Co-author: Hanh Le, November 2023
AFA 2025 · 2024 Santiago Finance Workshop
 · 2024 UNC Solutions for Reducing Wealth Inequality
Paper
 · BibTeX · Liberty Street

Abstract: We find that banks differ in their propensity to lend to minorities based on their stakeholders’ aversion to inequality. Using mortgage application data collected under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, we document a large and persistent cross-sectional variation in banks’ propensity to lend to minorities. Inequality-averse banks have a higher propensity to lend to borrowers in high-minority areas and, within census tracts, to non-white borrowers compared to other banks. This higher propensity (i) is not explained by selection of applicants, (ii) allows these banks to retain and attract their inequality-averse stakeholders, and (iii) does not predict worse ex-post loan performance.

How do supply shocks to inflation generalize? Evidence from the pandemic era in Europe
Co-authors: Viral AcharyaTim EisertChristian Eufinger, August 2024
EFA 2024 · WFA 2024 · 2024 Yale Supply Chain Workshop · 2023 CEPR Paris Symposium

Paper · BibTeX · FT · VoxEU

Abstract: We document how the interaction of supply chain pressures, heightened household inflation expectations, and firm pricing power contributed to the pandemic-era surge in consumer price inflation in the euro area. Initially, supply chain pressures increased inflation, especially in manufacturing sectors, through a cost-push channel and raised inflation expectations. Subsequently, the cost-push channel intensified as firms with high pricing power increased product markups in sectors witnessing high demand, including in services sectors that were initially not exposed to supply chain constraints. Eventually, even though supply chain pressures eased, these firms were able to further increase markups due to the stickiness of inflation expectations. The resulting persistent impact on inflation suggests supply-side impulses can generalize into broad-based inflation via an interaction of household expectations and firm pricing power.

Understanding the Pricing of Carbon Emissions: New Evidence from the Stock Market
Co-authors: Emilio OsambelaMatthew Pritsker, August 2024
2024 NBER SI EFEL

Paper · BibTeX

Abstract: Are carbon emissions priced in equity markets? The literature is split, but most research finds carbon emissions intensity, a measure targeted by ESG investors, is not priced. We show that: (i) most existing empirical tests suffer from measurement error and omitted variable bias, and (ii) if emissions intensity is priced, stock returns depend on expected emissions intensity and the product of the innovation in emissions intensity and the price-dividend ratio. Based on these new predictions, our empirical results confirm emissions intensity is priced, but the magnitude is largely driven by a few industries characterized by the presence of “super emitters.”