1) The (Unintended?) Consequences of the Largest Liquidity Injection Ever ›Paper ›BibTeX ›Google Scholar
Accepted at the Journal of Monetary Economics
Co-authored with Miguel Faria-e-Castro and Luìs Fonseca
Lender-of-last-resort interventions can exacerbate the bank-sovereign nexus.
2) The Design and Transmission of Central Bank Liquidity Provisions
Being revised for resubmission at the Journal of Financial Economics
Co-authored with Luisa Carpinelli, August 2018
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AFA 2017, RFS BSRMM 2017
Young Economist Award, ECB Forum on Central Banking
Edwin Elton Prize for the Best Finance JMP at NYU Stern
Media Mentions: Wall Street Journal
Abstract: We show how the design of central bank provisions of collateralized liquidity to banks following a wholesale funding dry-up affects their transmission. Combining Italian banks’ security-level holdings with the national credit register, we analyze the role of maturity and collateral during the ECB’s three-year Long-Term Refinancing Operations. We find that (i) long-term liquidity helped banks hit by the dry-up support their credit supply to firms; (ii) a government guarantee, by allowing these banks to expand their eligible collateral, was necessary for the transmission to firms; and (iii) banks used most liquidity to buy government bonds.
Being revised for resubmission (2nd round) at the Journal of Financial Economics
Paper · BibTeX
EFA 2016, OxFIT 2016, Barcelona Summer Forum 2015
Eleventh Klaus Liebscher Award, 2015
Ieke van den Burg Prize for Research on Systemic Risk, Shortlisted, 2016
Abstract: I develop a model where the sovereign debt capacity depends on the capitalization of domestic banks. Low-capital banks optimally tilt their government bond portfolio toward domestic securities, linking their destiny to that of the sovereign. If the sovereign risk is sufficiently high, low-capital banks reduce private lending to further increase their holdings of domestic government bonds, lowering sovereign yields and supporting the home sovereign debt capacity. The model rationalizes, in the context of the eurozone periphery, the increase in domestic government bond holdings, the reduction of bank credit supply, and the prolonged fragility of the financial sector.
4) The Anatomy of the Transmission of Macroprudential Policies
Co-authors: V. Acharya, K. Bergant, T. Eisert, F. McCann, May 2019
Paper · BibTeX
FIRS 2018, LSE PWC, NBER SI (CF), EFA 2019, WFA-CFAR 2019, AFA 2020
Abstract: We analyze the effect of regulatory limits on household leverage on residential mortgage credit, house prices, and banks’ portfolio choice. Combining supervisory loan level and house price data, we examine the introduction of loan-to-income and loan-to-value limits on residential mortgages in Ireland. Mortgage credit is reallocated from low- to high-income borrowers and from high- to low-house price appreciation areas, cooling down, in turn, “hot” housing markets. Consistent with a bank portfolio choice channel, banks more affected by the limits drive this reallocation and increase their risk-taking in their securities holdings and corporate credit, two asset classes not targeted by the policy.
5) Zombie Credit and (Dis-)Inflation: Evidence from Europe
Co-authors: V. Acharya, T. Eisert, C. Eufinger, June 2019
FRBNY/NYU Stern FI 2019
Abstract: We show that cheap credit to impaired firms has a disinflationary effect. By helping distressed firms to stay afloat, this “zombie credit” creates excess production capacity that, in turn, puts downward pressure on markups and product prices. We test this mechanism exploiting granular inflation and firm-level data from eleven European countries. In the cross-section of industries and countries, we find that a rise of zombie credit is associated with a decrease in firm defaults, average firm markups and product prices, lower investment and productivity, and an increase in aggregate sales as well as material and labor cost. Our results are stronger for prices of non-tradable products, which are more affected by local credit markets, and hold at the firm level, where we document spillover effects to healthy firms in markets with high zombie credit.