Discussion of:

Monetary Policy Complementarity: Bank Regulation and Interest Rates

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Monetary Policy

In a nutshell

· Bank capital regulation increases banks' demand for long-term government bonds

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- Unweighted capital requirement \rightarrow SLR

- Long-term bonds are an attractive asset for hedging


- As rates \downarrow , long-term Treasuries increase in price helping with the drop in net interest margin

- As rates \downarrow , long-term Treasuries can be ... not marked-to-market
- Treated favorably by "weighted" capital regulations

ightarrow Capital regulation reduces long-term yields, acting as unconventional monetary policy


SLR

- · SLR announced in 2014:Q3 based on tier 1 capital/total exposures (comply by 2018:Q1)
- \cdot Applies to banks with assets > \$250B (or foreign exposures > \$10B)
- · Baseline SLR 3% (for systemically important banks SLR is 5%)
- \rightarrow SLR has become the binding constraint
 - Greenwood et al. (2017) shows SLR was the binding constraints for the top-5 banks in 2017
 - Ex-post evidence: SLR relaxed in 2020 as banks got inundated with deposits
 - SLR being binding is crucial for this paper \rightarrow direct evidence would help a lot



Reduced form: SLR $\rightarrow \uparrow$ Holdings of LT Treasuries

- · Main diff-in-diff at the time-month level: SLR vs non-SLR (pre-/post-2014:Q3)
- · Price effect rests on the inelasticity in long term bond markets
 - More descriptive about the holders of long-term Treasuries (e.g., "others" increasing)
 - "Long-term" bonds are bonds with maturity >1Y in the paper



Reduced form: SLR $\rightarrow \uparrow$ Holdings of LT Treasuries

- · Standard diff-in-diff (then also using deregulation of medium-sized banks in 2018)
 - What is the rationale for the triple diff (as opposed to a "horse race" specification)?
 - Why are the results more pronounced for low capital banks (unweighted capital ratio)?

	Long Bonds/Assets	Long Bonds/Assets
SLR Bank x Post	5.63^{***}	1.77
	(0.72)	(1.39)
SLR Bank x Low Capital x Post		5.46^{***}
		(1.38)
SLR Bank x LCR Gap x Post		-0.42
		(0.30)
SLR Bank x Low RBC x Post		-1.35
		(1.04)
Sample	All	All
Bank Controls	Yes	Yes
Bank FE	Yes	Yes
Date FE	Yes	Yes
Num. obs.	18058	13906
R^2	0.84	0.82

***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1

Literature on capital regulation and govt bond holdings

- · Large literature on this topic during the eurozone crisis
 - Bank capital and govt bond holdings: Farhi and Tirole (2018), Crosignani (2021)
 - ECB and banks' govt bond holdings/yields: Schnabl et al. (2016), Crosignani et al. (2020)

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- · More generally, see Reis "Fiscal Footprint of Macroprudential Policy"
 - + large macro literature on "financial repression"
- · Link the analysis more closely to monetary policy
 - e.g., discuss time series evolution of shock to demand of the banking sector GIV_t

Are countercyclical capital requirements necessarily desirable?

- · Domestic banks absorb large quantity of Treasuries, keeping yields low
- · Credit to firms and households increasingly provided by NBFIs
- But MTM losses as rates *increase*. Are banks gambling, while being protected by limited liability? (Low capital banks increase govt bond holdings the most)

· Impressive paper, highly topical given the increasing size of the Treasury market and foreigners potentially reducing their demand for Treasuries

- $\cdot\,$ Nice combination of reduced form, model, and calibrated counterfactuals
- My suggestions/comments:
 - Interpretation of the results as "unconventional monetary policy"
 - What if rates go up?
 - More work to understand which regulatory capital constraint binds