

Geopolitical Risk and Decoupling: Evidence from U.S. Export Controls*

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Abstract

Increasing geopolitical risks prompted countries to use various economic tools to protect their national security interests. Analyzing export controls between the U.S. and China, we document that these measures prompt a broad-based decoupling of national and targeted-country supply chains. U.S. suppliers are more likely to terminate relations with Chinese customers following the imposition of export controls, including those not targeted by the policy. However, we find no evidence of reshoring or friend-shoring. Due to these disruptions, affected U.S. suppliers experience negative abnormal stock returns, wiping out \$130 billion in market capitalization, and a drop in bank lending, profitability, and employment.

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1 Introduction

After decades of continuous globalization, the global landscape is now shifting towards fragmentation and decoupling, particularly between the U.S. and China. As tensions between the two nations intensify, the U.S. government has implemented export controls as a strategic measure to maintain its technological leadership. Specifically, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) under the Department of Commerce forbids U.S. companies from exporting specific goods and services to a list of Chinese firms (called Chinese targets) deemed to be a risk to U.S. national security and foreign policy interests. While aimed at stopping the transfer of U.S. technologies to China, export controls restrict the customer base of some domestic firms. As such, they may impose collateral damage on the same domestic firms creating the valuable technologies that the U.S. government is trying to protect.

Despite being the primary tool used by the U.S. to maintain an edge over China and possibly accelerating the decoupling between the two nations, there is little to no evidence on the costs and benefits of export controls. In this paper, we bridge this gap and study the supply chain reconfiguration and associated financial and real effects following the imposition of export controls by the U.S. government. First, we study the effects on the affected suppliers, namely the U.S. firms that supply goods and services to the Chinese targets. Then, in the second part of the paper, we discuss some strategic responses deployed by China after U.S. export controls.

To start, we find that export controls prompt a broad-based decoupling of affected U.S. suppliers from Chinese firms. In particular, following the inclusion of Chinese targets in the

BIS lists, affected suppliers are more likely to terminate relations with Chinese customers—both those that are directly targeted by export controls and those that are not. Moreover, affected suppliers are also less likely to form new relations with other Chinese customers. This broad-based decoupling from China is consistent with concerns by affected U.S. suppliers that other Chinese firms may re-export their sensitive technology to the targeted Chinese firms, a violation of export control.

Despite export controls achieving their main purpose of reducing transfers of U.S. goods and technology to Chinese targets, we do not observe new supply chain relations formed by U.S. firms with alternative customers located outside of China, nor specifically with domestic ones. In other words, we do not find any evidence of friend-shoring or reshoring in the three-year period following the imposition of export controls. The inability of affected suppliers to quickly find alternative customers may therefore harm the very same firms whose technology U.S. export controls are trying to protect. Thus, we explore the financial and real effects of export controls on the affected U.S. suppliers and document significant collateral damage.

Specifically, we find that affected U.S. suppliers experience negative cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) once the Chinese targets are added to the BIS export control lists. This negative stock market reaction occurs immediately after the export control announcement and is economically significant, representing a 2.5% abnormal decline in stock prices. Our estimates suggest that export controls cost the average affected U.S. supplier \$857 million in lost market capitalization, with total losses across all the suppliers of \$130 billion. The expected benefits of export controls ought to be carefully weighed against the costs we estimate.

We also find that the affected suppliers experience negative real outcomes following the imposition of export controls. Relative to similar firms, affected suppliers display a decline in revenues and profitability, which represents real collateral damage from export controls. In addition, we estimate a significant decline in employment among the affected U.S. suppliers, while the effect on capital expenditures is not significant. The last result is consistent with export controls not considerably changing the long-term investment opportunities of firms, but with the decline in profitability requiring a cut to some segments of the labor force. Using confidential loan-level data, we also find a decline in bank lending to affected U.S. suppliers.

In the second part of the paper, we ask how the targeted Chinese firms strategically respond to U.S. export controls. On the extensive margin, we observe that the Chinese targets offset the reduction in relations with U.S. suppliers by forming new ones with alternative Chinese suppliers—an indication of reshoring on the Chinese side. On the intensive margin, non-U.S. firms that currently supply goods to the targeted Chinese firms experience an increase in revenues and profitability following the imposition of U.S. export controls. We interpret these results as evidence that Chinese firms try to offset U.S. export controls by both forming a new network of alternative Chinese suppliers and increasing purchases from firms which are not affected by U.S. export controls and with whom they have pre-existing relations.

The case of the Dutch lithography company ASML is indeed an example of such strategic Chinese response. While U.S. export controls restricted the flow of U.S.-made microchip technology to China, the latter managed to increase the purchase of ASML lithographic machinery to produce cutting-edge microchips. Only several years later and after significant

pressure from the U.S. did the Dutch government restrict the ability of ASML to export its machinery to China. Complementing our results, [Han, Jiang and Mei \(2023\)](#) document that another strategy deployed by China to blunt the effect of U.S. export controls is to boost domestic innovation via government subsidies.

Our results are unlikely to be driven by the 2018-2019 trade war between the U.S. and China that saw a few waves of U.S. tariffs on Chinese imports followed by Chinese retaliatory tariffs on U.S. exports. While those tariffs were broad-based and not targeting specific companies ([Fajgelbaum et al., 2020](#); [Amiti, Redding and Weinstein, 2019](#)), our estimates rely on the identification of U.S. companies that are not allowed to export to *specific* Chinese entities. The use of granular fixed effects allows us to exploit variation within industry and size quartiles among firms that export to China, and are thus unlikely to be affected by broad-based tariffs. Similarly, our results also unlikely to be driven by the August 2022 CHIPS Act which provided subsidies to chip makers with operations in the U.S. and the August 2023 executive order which limited U.S. investments to China in some sensitive sectors. Indeed, these policies apply to a broad set of firms and not just to our set of affected suppliers, and are enacted at the very end of our sample.

Our paper contributes to the recent literature on geopolitical risk in economics and finance. Some studies have documented the labor and trade costs of U.S.-China trade wars (e.g., [Benguria and Saffie, 2023, 2020](#); [Flaaen, Hortaçsu and Tintelnot, 2020](#); [Fajgelbaum et al., 2020](#)). [Cen, Fos and Jiang \(2022\)](#) focus on the effect of Chinese Five-Year Plans on U.S. firms, while [Bian and Meier \(2023\)](#) consider the effect of CEO incentives on technological transfers to China. [Caldara and Iacoviello \(2022\)](#) develop a news-based measure of adverse geopolitical

events and associated risks. More closely related to our analysis, [Han, Jiang and Mei \(2023\)](#) describe the effect of Chinese industrial policy and U.S. export controls on the innovation output of Chinese firms. We complement their findings in two ways. First, we show the collateral damage of U.S. export controls on U.S. firms. Second, we document the strategic response of Chinese firms to export controls in terms of supply chain reconfigurations.

Similarly, our findings provide insights to the nascent theoretical literature in geoeconomics. [Clayton, Maggiori and Schreger \(2023a\)](#) show theoretically that in the presence of negative externalities, export controls may be optimal. Relatedly, [Liu, Rotemberg and Traiberman \(2024\)](#) build a trade model in which export controls and technology transfers impact domestic welfare. Calibrating the model to the semiconductor sector, they argue that intermediate levels of export controls are detrimental to the domestic economy, but that comprehensive export controls could raise domestic welfare. In our paper, we point to several factors that may increase the costs (domestic supply chain rigidity) and diminish the benefits (circumvention, foreign supply chain flexibility, and indigenous innovation) of export controls.

Our paper is also connected to the economic literature on sanctions (e.g., [Efing, Goldbach and Nitsch, 2023](#); [Ahn and Ludema, 2020](#); [Felbermayr et al., 2020](#); [Crozet et al., 2021](#); [Besedeš, Goldbach and Nitsch, 2021](#)). While tariffs increase trading costs and are often used to protect domestic nascent industries and raising government revenues, sanctions instead prohibit some or all trade and capital flows with a specific country. Historically, sanctions have been used to influence another country's behavior without resorting to military interventions ([Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 2007](#)), and range from broad trade restrictions to more targeted “small yard, high fence” interventions. Examples of broad sanctions include the U.S. embargoes on Cuba

and Iraq, while more targeted sanctions include those on Russian oligarchs in the aftermath of the annexation of Crimea and full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Since sanctions are usually applied to either small countries or a selected group of individuals connected to a specific administration, they tend to have limited negative effects on U.S. firms. On the other hand, export controls against Chinese firms are different. Indeed, due to the interconnectedness of U.S. and Chinese firms, forbidding the export of high-tech products to large Chinese multinationals can have a pronounced negative impact on the profitability of domestic firms.

Finally, we contribute to the supply chain literature by exploring emerging risks to global supply chains. While most of the literature has explored the propagation of financial shocks (Alfaro, García-Santana and Moral-Benito, 2021; Cortes, Silva and Van Doornik, 2019; Costello, 2020), natural disasters (Boehm, Flaaen and Pandalai-Nayar, 2019; Barrot and Sauvagnat, 2016; Carvalho et al., 2021), and cyberattacks (Crosignani, Macchiavelli and Silva, 2023; Garg, 2020), we explore how export control shocks propagate through the supply chain and how supply chains themselves are reconfigured following the imposition of export controls. As such, our paper also complements the work by Alfaro and Chor (2023) documenting recent shifts in U.S. imports away from China and towards alternative locations, such as Vietnam and Mexico. Relatedly, we also contribute to the supply chain literature that studies the dynamic evolution of supply chains following shocks (Elliott, Golub and Leduc, 2022; Pankratz and Schiller, 2023) by detailing the decoupling process initiated by export controls.

2 Background

In this section we provide some background on the regulations and policies surrounding export controls and then describe a few case studies of export controls to highlight the main motivations for such measures.

The use of economic linkages and dependencies as a weapon has many historical precedents, including Britain and France imposing blockades on Germany during World War I and Germany retaliating by endangering transatlantic commerce with the use of U-boats (Mulder, 2022). At the beginning of World War II, U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt passed the Export Control Act of 1940, limiting the shipment of critical military supplies to Japan in an effort to curtail the bellicose potential of the Axis powers. After the war, the Export Control Act was expanded to prevent the export of sensitive technologies to the Soviet Union. Formally, the Export Administration Act of 1979 authorizes the U.S. President to control exports of U.S. goods and technology to all foreign destinations for national security and foreign policy purposes. The 1979 Act is implemented via the Export Administration Regulations.

2.1 Export Administration Regulations

Title 15 of the United States Code contains regulations related to trade and commerce. In particular, Chapter VII introduces Export Administration Regulations (EAR). These are issued by the Bureau of Industry and Security, BIS, of the Department of Commerce to control certain export activities. Part 774, Supplement No. 4, also known as the “Entity

List”, contains names of foreign persons, including businesses, institutes, and universities, that are subject to license requirements for the export, re-export, and in-country transfer of certain items. In other words, U.S. firms that intend to export, re-export, and transfer goods and services to foreign firms included in the Entity List must first obtain a license from the Commerce Department. In addition to U.S. firms, BIS export controls also apply to foreign firms that use U.S.-origin components, manufacturing equipment, technology, and software.¹ The BIS license review policy indicates that, for the most part, there is a presumption of license denial.

An item requires an export license from the Commerce Department if it belongs to the Commerce Control List (CCL), which includes nuclear material, toxins, electronics, computers, telecommunications, information security, navigation, sensors, lasers, aerospace and propulsion systems. Any other item is designated as EAR99, including low-tech consumer goods, and requires a license only if it is exported to embargoed countries or end-users of concern. The latter consists of persons, institutes, universities, and corporations included in the Entity List or other similar lists described below. A license can thus be required not only for CCL items but also EAR99 items that are intended to be exported to parties included in the Entity List. The specific license requirement details are provided in Part 744, Supplement No. 4, for each company included in the Entity List.

The first Entity List was published in 1997 and was meant to limit exports to entities engaging in the production of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Since then, reasons

¹See [Part 734.9 Foreign-Direct Product Rules](#) for more details.

for inclusion in the Entity List have expanded to limit “activities contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States”. In particular, items subject to EAR export controls include purely civilian items, items with both civil and military use (dual-use), terrorism or potential WMD-related applications, and items that are exclusively used for military applications. Other offices in the State and Treasury Departments have jurisdiction over EAR export controls, including the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and the Department of State’s International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). Decisions regarding the Entity List are made by the End-User Review Committee, which is composed of representatives of the Departments of Commerce, State, Defense, Energy and, where appropriate, the Treasury. An entry to the Entity List requires a majority vote while unanimity is required for removal or modification.

On December 23, 2022, the BIS introduced an additional list, the Military End User (MEU) list, published in Part 774, Supplement No. 7. Entities are added to the MEU list if they represent “unacceptable risk of use in or diversion to a ‘military end use’ or ‘military end user’ in China, Russia, or Venezuela.” In other words, entities are added to the MEU list if they are considered producers or intermediaries of military technologies ultimately used by China, Russia, or Venezuela. Any exporter of military items (listed in Part 744, Supplement No. 2) to entities included in the MEU list must receive prior license.

Finally, the BIS also publishes the Unverified List (UVL) in Part 774, Supplement No. 6. Inclusion in the UVL generally occurs if the BIS cannot verify the legitimacy of the end-user and end-user of items subject to export controls. The BIS removes an entity from the UVL when it can verify the legitimacy of the listed person as an end-user through the completion

of a pre-license check or a post-shipment verification. To export items in the CCL to entities in the UVL, a license is required. On the other hand, to export EAR99 items, the end-user must provide a statement with an agreement to comply with EAR and a declaration about the end-use for the item.²

From the point of view of a U.S. firm trying to export goods and services to foreign companies, the inclusion of such foreign companies in either the Entity List or the MEU list is therefore more restrictive than inclusion in the Unverified List.

In addition to export controls, the U.S. government deploys other tools towards selected Chinese companies. Chiefly among them, the Treasury Department's OFAC forbids U.S. persons from buying or selling securities issued by a list of Chinese companies belonging to the Chinese military industrial complex. The list is spelled out in Executive Orders 13959 of November 12, 2020 and 14032 of June 3, 2021. The purpose of such actions is to deny access to U.S. capital markets to Chinese companies that "enable the development and modernization of its military, [...] which continues to allow the [People's Republic of China] to directly threaten the United States homeland".

²In October 2022, the BIS announced a new two-step policy to address foreign government interference with end-use checks. If end-use checks are not completed within 60 days, the BIS will initiate the regulatory process to add the foreign party to the UVL. If the addition to the UVL is due to the interference of the foreign government, a second 60-day clock starts after the listing. If the BIS is unable to complete an end-use check within the second 60-day clock, it will start a process to move the foreign party from the UVL to the Entity List.

2.2 Entity List Case Studies

Next, we provide some examples of Chinese firms included in the Entity List to highlight the different motivations for export controls. Huawei is a Chinese company specialized in telecommunications equipment and consumer electronics. It became the largest telecommunications equipment manufacturer in 2012 and the largest smart-phone manufacturer in June 2020. Regarding the development of 5G networks, some countries voiced concerns that Huawei’s equipment could be used as a backdoor for espionage by the Chinese military and intelligence services, citing the 2014 Counter-Espionage Law and the 2017 National Intelligence Law of the People’s Republic of China that require Chinese companies to cooperate on intelligence gathering. Indeed, western intelligence agencies have alleged that Huawei’s equipment was used for hacking into several telecommunication companies in U.S., Canada, and Australia, such as Nortel, Cysco, and Optus.

Moreover, in January 2019 the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) unsealed an indictment alleging that Huawei circumvented U.S. sanctions on Iran and was involved in the theft of trade secrets from telecommunications companies around the world, including T-Mobile. Shortly after, in May 2019, the BIS added Huawei and its subsidiaries to the Entity List on the grounds that it violated U.S. sanctions on Iran by causing the export of goods, technology, and services from the U.S. to Iran without obtaining a license from OFAC. Several additions of Huawei’s affiliates to the Entity List occurred up to April 2022.

Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation Incorporated (SMIC) is the largest semiconductor manufacturer in China. SMIC was added to the Entity List as a result of its activities with the Chinese military industrial complex. “The Entity List designation limits

SMIC’s ability to acquire certain U.S. technology by requiring exporters, reexporters, and in-country transferors of such technology to apply for a license to sell to the company. Items uniquely required to produce semiconductors at advanced technology nodes 10 nanometers or below will be subject to a presumption of denial to prevent such key enabling technology from supporting China’s military modernization efforts.”

Another motivation to include Chinese companies in the Entity List has to do with intellectual property (IP) theft. A clear case of IP theft-driven inclusion involves Fujian Jinhua Integrated Circuit Company (Jinhua). On October 30, 2018, Jinhua was included in the Entity List for being “involved in activities that could have a negative impact on the national security interests of the United States.” On November 1, 2018, the Department of Justice issues an indictment charging Jinhua with crimes related to economic espionage and theft of intellectual property from Micron, a semiconductor company specialized in memory storage devices, including dynamic random-access memory.

3 Data

We use several data sources to examine the financial and real effects of export controls. First, information on export controls comes from the Bureau of Industry and Security, part of the U.S. Department of Commerce, and can be obtained online via the Federal Register (federalregister.gov) and the Code of Federal Regulations (ecfr.gov). We hand-collect additions and removals of Chinese companies from the Entity List (Part 774, Supplement No. 4), the Military End Use list (Part 774, Supplement No. 7) and the Unverified List (Part 774,

Supplement No. 6). For each entity, we collect the many aliases that are often provided, the dates in which the notices of addition and removal are announced, the dates in which they become effective (usually 5 calendar days after the announcement), and the physical addresses of the entities and their aliases. For consistency, we only focus on Chinese entities, since they are the vast majority of the targets of export controls that can be matched with our supply chain data.

Excluding aliases from the 1,120 total Chinese entries, we have 732 unique Chinese entities. Out of them, 497 are corporations, and 235 are universities and institutions. Moreover, 425 are from the Entity List, 58 from the MEU list, and 253 from the UVL. The total across lists is greater than the total number of Chinese entities since some are listed in multiple lists at different points in time. For instance, some could be listed in both Entity and MEU lists, while others initially included in the UVL end up permanently in the Entity List. The Entity List starts in 1997 and most of the Chinese entities are added after 2014. The MEU list currently contains Chinese companies added on December 23, 2020 and January 14, 2021. The Unverified List starts in 2002, with most of the Chinese entities included after 2019.

Second, information on supply chain relationships comes from FactSet Revere, which is arguably the most comprehensive source of supply chain data available.³ Each supply chain relation contains names and identifiers of the customer and the supplier, as well as the start and end dates of the relation. The information is collected via public filings, investor presentations, websites, corporate actions, press releases, and news reports. We follow [Gofman](#),

³For instance, Bloomberg and Capital IQ do not report at sufficiently high frequency the start and end dates of a supply chain relationship, while the Compustat Segments data report only the largest customers of a given supplier at the annual frequency.

Segal and Wu (2020) and Crosignani, Macchiavelli and Silva (2023) and drop relations with start and end dates included within a longer relationship between the same two entities, and combine multiple relations with time gaps shorter than 6 months into a continuous relationship. Using International Securities Identification Numbers (ISINs) as well as name matching, we are able to identify 92 Chinese entities subject to export controls (target firms), which have supply chain relations with a total of 358 affected suppliers. Out of these, 176 have supply chain relations overlapping with the export control event dates.⁴ Our sample for supply chain reconfiguration analysis covers data up to 2023:Q3.

Third, we obtain daily stock price data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP daily stock file) and firm-level balance sheet data from Compustat (North America, fundamentals annual). To match firm identifiers among CRSP, Compustat, and Factset data, we use the firm's CUSIP. The final daily stock price sample has a total of 250 events arising from 156 affected suppliers spanning from 2010 to 2022. The number of events is higher than that of affected suppliers because some Chinese target firms are included in BIS lists multiple times, often because some previously neglected subsidiaries are added later on.⁵ On the other hand, the firm-level balance sheet annual panel goes from 2007 to 2022 and has a total of 655 firms, of which 126 are affected suppliers. We focus on firms that export to China and remove firms with less than \$5 million in total assets.

To assess whether Chinese firms manage to circumvent U.S. export controls by purchasing similar goods from unaffected firms outside of the U.S., we also obtain balance sheet data

⁴We allow one year buffer between the event date and supply chain relationship end year.

⁵For each affected supplier, we consider events that happen at least 6 months apart when estimating the pre-treated betas and cumulative abnormal returns.

on an international sample of firms from Capital IQ. Specifically, we obtain EBIT (universal net earnings before interest and taxes) and revenues (universal revenue attributable to the ongoing operations) for 6,372 suppliers of Chinese firms, 600 of which are connected to firms targeted by export controls.

Finally, we obtain loan-level information on bank credit to U.S. firms from the corporate loan schedule (H.1) of the Federal Reserve’s Y-14Q. These data have been collected since 2012 to support the Dodd-Frank Act’s stress tests and assess bank capital adequacy for large U.S. banks. The credit register provides confidential information at a quarterly frequency on credit exposures exceeding \$1 million for banks with more than \$50 billion in assets. These loans account for around 75 percent of all commercial and industrial lending volume during our sample period. In addition to the amount of committed credit between each firm-bank pair, the data set also contains information on the committed and drawn amounts on credit lines, the amount that is past due, and information on other loan characteristics, such as the interest rate spread, maturity, and collateral. We use the firms’ CUSIPs to identify firms affected by export controls in the loan-level data and, as before, focus on firms that export to China, resulting in a sample of 331 firms—71 of which are subject to export controls—borrowing from 38 banks from 2012:Q3 to 2023:Q3.

Panel A of Figure 1 shows the number of affected U.S. suppliers over time as BIS includes Chinese customers on the entity list. Most targeted Chinese firms belong to the telecommunication, transportation, and electronic equipment sectors, while most affected suppliers are in the electronics and industrial machinery equipment sectors (Figure 1, Panel B). Summary statistics on supply chain and balance sheet variables are presented in Tables 1

and 2, respectively. In the supply chain analysis, treated firms (affected suppliers) are those that export to Chinese entities in the BIS lists and control firms are restricted to those that export to Chinese firms not included in the BIS lists. Affected suppliers tend to have more total customers than control firms, and thus also terminate and form more customer relations relative to control firms. However, treated and control firms have a more similar geographical distribution of their customers. The average share of Chinese customers is 9.4% for treated and 5.8% for control firms, the European share is 13.6% for treated and 12.9% for control firms, and finally the domestic share is 40.5% for treated and 51.3% for control firms.

Affected suppliers, being exporters to Chinese conglomerates, tend to be larger in size than unaffected firms. They also tend to be more profitable (greater cash flow and return on assets), due to both higher operating income and lower interest payments over total assets. Once we split the sample by industry-specific size quartiles and focus on the sample of exporters to China, treated and control firms are more comparable, other than for the bottom size quartile (Table 3). Across all size quartiles, capital expenditure, interest expenses, and the number of employees are very similar between treated and control firms. Since size quartiles are computed within each industry (2-digit SIC code), it is still possible that treated firms are larger than control ones within each size quartile if treated firms are concentrated in industries with larger firms on average. However, this is not a concern in our empirical analysis since we compare each treated firm to control units within the same industry and the same industry-specific size quartile.

4 Empirical Strategy and Results

We use different methodologies when estimating the effect of export controls on abnormal stock return and real outcomes (including supply chain and balance sheet variables). For ease of exposition, we first discuss the event study approach to estimate cumulative abnormal returns.

To study the stock market reaction to export controls, we estimate abnormal stock returns of affected suppliers around the announcement dates of their Chinese customers being added to the relevant BIS lists: Entity List, UVL, and MEU list. Affected suppliers are the U.S. firms that export to the Chinese entities included in the BIS lists. The same affected supplier can participate to multiple events if it exports to more than one target company or if the same target company enters the BIS lists more than once. The latter can happen when different subsidiaries of the same company are added at different times. For those reasons we have 250 events and 156 unique affected suppliers. The main specifications estimate cumulative abnormal returns in a $[-10, 20]$ day window around the event date, using either the Fama-French 3-factor model (Fama and French, 1993) or the Fama-French 5-factor model (Fama and French, 2015).⁶

We also study the effect of export controls on the real outcomes of affected suppliers, including supply chain and balance sheet variables. The BIS has been including Chinese entities in the various export control lists since the early 2000s in a staggered fashion. Due

⁶We follow standard event study method to use $[-150, -50]$ day window to estimate betas and then estimate the out-of-sample abnormal returns during the event window $[-10, 20]$.

to staggered nature of the shock (i.e., a Chinese customer is included in a BIS list), a standard differences-in-differences model may produce biased estimates of the treatment effects.⁷ Therefore, we employ the stacked regression estimator methodology developed by Gormley and Matsa (2011) and described in Baker, Larcker and Wang (2022). Specifically, we stack observations from multiple cohorts, where a cohort includes treated and control firms in a $[-3, 3]$ year window centered around an event. We restrict the control group to firms that are either never treated or not yet treated. An event is the first time that a Chinese firm is included in a BIS export control list, while treatment refers to the first time that a firm’s customer is included in the BIS lists. We then estimate the following stacked regression specification:

$$y_{ict} = \sum_{j=-3}^{j=3} \beta_j \mathbb{1}(J_{ict} = j) + \mu_{ic} + \mu_{ckt} + \varepsilon_{ict} \quad (1)$$

where c indicates a specific cohort, i a firm, and t a year. y_{ict} is the outcome variable for firm i in cohort c and year t , including cash flow, ebit, capex, revenue, and employees. When we analyze supply chain relation data and use count or count-like outcome variables, such as the number of terminated relations, we follow Cohn, Liu and Wardlaw (2022) and estimate Poisson regressions using the maximum likelihood approach of Correia, Guimarães and Zylkin (2020). $\mathbb{1}(J_{ict} = j)$ is an indicator variable equal to one if an export control c on a Chinese customer of firm i occurred j years apart from the event year. Each cohort includes observations from 3 years before to 3 years after the event. The interaction term for the year prior to

⁷See Roth et al. (2023), for instance, for a detailed review of the recent literature on staggered differences-in-differences designs.

treatment is excluded and thus constitutes the omitted group. Each cohort c includes treated, never treated, and not yet treated units. To make sure that each treated unit is compared to units within the same cohort that are similar in terms of industry and size, we include cohort-industry-size quartile-year fixed effects, μ_{ckt} . As customary in stacked regressions, we also include firm-cohort fixed effects, μ_{ic} . Standard errors are double-clustered at the firm and year levels.

Sometimes different subsidiaries of the same Chinese parent company are added sequentially to the BIS lists. This happens because the Department of Commerce later finds out that additional subsidiaries may acquire controlled technology for the same target parent company. Often, further subsidiaries are included just a few months later. For a specific U.S. firm, we include events that are at least six months apart to avoid contamination on the CAR estimates. While each of these additions is treated as a separate event in the CAR study, multiple treatments are more cumbersome to deal with in a panel setting with yearly data. To only capture the specific Chinese entity with which U.S. firms conduct a meaningful amount of business, in our main yearly panel regressions (Eq. 1) we define treatment as the first time that a parent company of a Chinese customer enters the BIS lists, conditional on the U.S. supplier having a sizable CAR response to such event.⁸ To select the more stringent among all export controls, in some specifications we further restrict the sample to Chinese

⁸Specifically, if a Chinese customer of U.S. firm i is added multiple times under different aliases or subsidiary names to the BIS lists, we require that the first one of such events is also the one with the most negative CAR response for firm i . This requirement excludes 17 out of the 156 treatments. These are instances in which the first inclusion in the BIS list covers a limited number of goods or only includes a certain subsidiary that has only marginal importance to the U.S. firm. Using the full sample that includes the first time that parent company enters a BIS list (without CAR response restrictions), results are qualitatively unchanged, albeit a bit more noisy due to the inclusion of firms that are only marginally affected.

firms belonging to the Entity List and the MEU list (“Restrictive Sample”), thus excluding the less restrictive and often temporary inclusions in the Unverified List.

In robustness tests, we also estimate the more standard (albeit potentially biased) two-way fixed effects (TWFE) model, as follows:

$$y_{it} = \sum_{j=-3}^{j=3} \beta_j \mathbb{1}(J_{it} = j) + \mu_i + \mu_{kt} + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (2)$$

where y_{it} and is an outcome of firm i in year t and $\mathbb{1}(J_{it} = j)$ is an indicator variable equal to one if an export control on a Chinese customer of firm i occurred j years from the event year. We consider a window of 3 years around the incident date ($-3 \leq j \leq 3$). The interaction term for the year prior to treatment is excluded and is thus part of the omitted group. We include firm and industry-size quartile-year fixed effects, namely μ_i and μ_{kt} , respectively. The latter fixed effects are included to make sure that the control group consists of firms in the same industry and of comparable size as the treated firms. Since treated firms are by definition exporting to China, we require control firms to also be exporting to China (but not to the BIS-targeted entities), in addition to belonging to the same industry as the treated firms. Standard errors are double-clustered at the firm and year levels.

Our main results using the stacked regression approach of Eq. (1) are qualitatively similar to those employing the TWFE model of Eq. (2). This is consistent with the fact that the TWFE bias is less likely to be a problem when the number of ever-treated units is small relative to the full sample (Baker, Larcker and Wang, 2022), as it is the case in our setting.

4.1 Decoupling and Supply Chain Dynamics

First, we study how supply chain relations respond to export controls. By definition, affected suppliers are required to stop exporting certain critical goods to their Chinese customers included in the BIS export control lists. To make sure that control firms are comparable to the treated ones, we require control firms in each cohort to be exporting to China in the pre-treatment period.

We explore various ways in which export controls may lead to a U.S.-China decoupling. Specifically, we study the effect of export controls on both termination and creation of relations with Chinese customers. Since the affected suppliers are required to terminate relations only with the Chinese firms targeted by export controls, we explore whether affected suppliers selectively terminate relations only with the targeted Chinese customers or more broadly with any of their Chinese customers. Terminating relations with Chinese customers not directly targeted by export controls could indicate concerns that these other Chinese firms may re-export the technology to the directly targeted firms, a violation of BIS rules.

Notice that we cannot directly estimate whether affected suppliers are more likely to terminate relations with Chinese targets because control firms by definition do not have relations with those firms. As a result, we estimate the effect of export controls on the number of terminated relations with any Chinese customer and compare it to the effect on terminated relations excluding the Chinese targets. If affected suppliers terminate relations only with the directly targeted firms, we would estimate a significant effect only on total terminations and not on terminations excluding Chinese targets. If, on the other hand, affected suppliers terminate relations with both groups, we should estimate significant effects on terminations

with any Chinese customer as well as excluding Chinese targets, albeit with the latter effect being smaller in magnitude.

Finally, we study whether affected suppliers are also less likely to form new relations with other Chinese customers following export controls. Indeed, concerns about re-export may make affected U.S. suppliers reluctant to sell critical technology to new Chinese customers. Studying both the termination of existing relations and the creation of new ones gives us a full picture of the dynamic supply chain reconfiguration following the imposition of export controls. The supply chain variables, summarized in Table 1, are the total number of terminated or new relations. We use Poisson regressions on these count variables, as suggested by [Cohn, Liu and Wardlaw \(2022\)](#).

Table 4 presents the regression results using the preferred stacked regression approach of Eq. (1) and displays the main coefficient of interest, $\text{Affected} \cdot \text{Post}$. The dependent variables are the number of terminated relations with Chinese customers in columns (1) to (3), with Chinese customers excluding the targeted ones in columns (4) to (6), and the number of new relations with Chinese customers in columns (7) to (9). In columns (3), (6), and (9), we also interact our fixed effects with the quartile of the lagged number of total customers as a way to control for differences in the richness of supply chain relations between treated and control firms. As a result, we compare firms with a similar number of customers one year prior. The positive and significant coefficients of interest ($\text{Affected} \cdot \text{Post}$) in columns (1) to (3) indicate that export controls lead to more relations with Chinese customers being terminated. Once we exclude the Chinese customers directly targeted by export controls, the coefficients in columns (4) to (6) show that affected suppliers are more likely to terminate relations even with

Chinese firms that are not directly targeted by export controls. Comparing the coefficients in columns (3) and (6) indicates that affected suppliers are more likely to terminate relations not only with Chinese customers targeted by export controls, but also with other Chinese customers that are not directly targeted. Finally, columns (7) to (9) explore the formation of new relations with Chinese customers. We find that, after one of their customers is targeted by export controls, affected suppliers form fewer relations with new Chinese customers.

In addition to affected suppliers terminating more existing relations with Chinese firms (both targeted and not), new relations are also less likely to be formed, pointing to a long-lasting decoupling from China for the affected suppliers. This broad decoupling is consistent with a “wake-up call” whereby affected suppliers become more aware of geopolitical risk and the possibility of future controls. It is also consistent with fear that intermediate Chinese firms may purchase the sensitive goods and sell them back to the targeted firms, which is a violation of export control laws. The decoupling effects are not only statistically but also economically significant. Export controls lead to an increase in terminations with Chinese customers by 50%-75% (column 5-6), and a decline in the establishment of new Chinese customer relations by 60%-68% (column 8-9).⁹

Next, we explore whether affected suppliers reconfigure their supply chains and form new relations away from China to offset the drop in Chinese customers following export controls. The results are displayed in Table 5. The dependent variables are the total number of customers in columns (1) and (2) and total number of domestic (U.S.) customers in columns

⁹The interpretation of coefficients in a Poisson regression is equivalent to that of a linear regression where the outcome variable is in logs. Thus, we obtain these economic magnitudes by taking the exponential of the estimated coefficients and then subtracting one.

(3) and (4). The negative and significant coefficients of $\text{Affected} \cdot \text{Post}$ in columns (1) and (2) indicate that affected suppliers experience a reduction in the overall number of customers. They are therefore not able to significantly offset the reduction in Chinese customers due to the imposition of export controls by finding alternative ones in the following 3 years. We also find no evidence of reshoring. Indeed, the insignificant coefficients in columns (3) and (4) suggest that affected suppliers do not significantly change the number of domestic customers following export controls.

We further examine the effect of export controls on the customer shares of U.S. suppliers by regions. The results are displayed in Table 6. In Panel A, the dependent variables are the share of customers from the U.S. and China, respectively. The positive and significant coefficient of $\text{Affected} \cdot \text{Post}$ in columns (1) to (2) shows that affected suppliers are more reliant on domestic customers as they reduce the reliance on Chinese customers (column 3 to 4). As previously discussed, the greater reliance on domestic customers is simply due to the fact that the number of total customers declines while that of domestic customers is unchanged. In Panel B, we examine customer shares of U.S. suppliers from other regions in Asia and Europe. The dependent variables are the share of customers from Asia (excluding China), Asia allies (South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and Australia), and the European Union in columns (1) to (6). If U.S. suppliers reroute their customer base to politically friendly regions, we would expect an increase in customer shares from those regions. The negative and insignificant coefficients of $\text{Affected} \cdot \text{Post}$ in columns (1) to (6) suggest that firms are not friend-shoring and in general are not substituting the drop in Chinese customers with other international customers in the 3 years following export controls.

Our results are not driven by pre-trends, as we discuss next. Figure 2 displays the coefficient plots for total terminations, terminations excluding targeted Chinese firms, and new relations with Chinese firms using the preferred stacked regression approach of Eq. (1) (Panels A, C, and E) and the TWFE model of Eq. (2) (Panel B, D, and F). The dynamic plots show no pre-trends, indicating that our results are not due to pre-existing supply chain dynamics unrelated to export controls. Consistent with our previous static results, the coefficient plots show that following export controls there is a significant increase in the total number of terminations with Chinese customers, whether or not we include the targeted Chinese firms. At the same time, there also is a significant decrease in the number of new relations formed with Chinese customers. The results are qualitatively similar between the stacked regression approach and the TWFE method.

The supply chain results of Tables 4, 5, and 6 suggest that affected suppliers cannot easily find new customers to make up for the decline in Chinese customers following the imposition of export controls. The lack of any meaningful short-run adjustment in supply chains is consistent with the findings in [Boehm, Flaaen and Pandalai-Nayar \(2019\)](#) that the short-run elasticity of substitution between different inputs is near zero. As a result, export controls may inflict some collateral damage on the same U.S. firms whose technology they are trying to protect. Assessing the potential negative consequences of export controls on U.S. firms is the subject of the next analysis.

4.2 Export Controls and Negative Abnormal Returns

Next, we show evidence of the negative stock market reaction to news about export controls. Panels A and B of Figure 3 display the cumulative abnormal returns relative to the Fama-French 3-factor and 5-factor models, respectively. Upon announcement that Chinese entities are added to the BIS lists (the event), the U.S. suppliers of these targeted entities experience negative abnormal returns.

While there is no evidence of abnormal returns in the 10 days preceding the event, the market seem to quickly incorporate the negative news for the affected suppliers once the inclusion of the targeted entities in the BIS lists is announced.¹⁰ Most of the decline in CAR following the event is indeed concentrated within the first few days and persists for at least the next 20 days. The negative stock market reaction is an indication that export controls may create some collateral damage. To deny key Chinese firms access to U.S. technologies, export controls impose immediate valuation losses on the affected U.S. suppliers. On average, U.S. suppliers experience a negative 2.5% cumulative abnormal return in the 20 days following the export controls. This estimate implies that the average U.S. firm affected by export controls loses \$857 million in market capitalization. Across all the firms in our sample, this translates to a decrease in market capitalization of \$130 billion, which is economically significant.¹¹ The CAR results are quantitatively unchanged if we focus on the more restrictive export control

¹⁰The significant negative CAR happens at the post-announcement period. Five-factor $CAR[-10, -1]$ is -0.6% with 95% confidence interval being $[-0.015, 0.003]$. The five-factor $CAR[-10, 2]$ is -2.7% with the confidence interval being $[-0.038, -0.015]$. In the 3-factor model, the first day with significantly negative CAR is day -1 , while in the 5-factor model it is day zero.

¹¹The aggregate loss is estimated by multiplying the loss for the average affected supplier by the number of affected suppliers, 156.

events, namely those in the Entity and Military End Use lists (hence excluding events from the Unverified List), as shown in Appendix Figure B.1.

4.3 Real Collateral Damage

Finally, we document the real effects of export controls on the affected suppliers. By restricting sales to selected Chinese customers, export controls may lead to an economic loss for U.S. firms that export goods and services to the Chinese firms included in the BIS lists. This is especially likely given our previous findings that, at least in the short term, affected suppliers do not form new customer relations to offset the loss of business from the Chinese targets. While there may be some indirect benefits to the U.S. economy from restricting exports of cutting-edge technologies to strategic rivals, the affected suppliers are likely to face a direct and immediate business loss, a sort of collateral damage. We investigate these potentially detrimental effects next.

Figure 4 displays the dynamic effects of export controls on firms' cash flow, revenues, profitability (EBIT), capital expenditure (CAPEX), and the number of employees. The parallel trends assumption seems to be validated by the lack of pre-trends in all specifications. In addition, there is a significant drop in cash flow, revenues, profitability, and number of employees after the inclusion of a Chinese customer in the export control lists.

Table 7 displays the real effect of export controls on affected suppliers. The dependent variables are cash flow in columns (1) to (2), revenues in columns (3) to (4), EBIT in columns (5) to (6), CAPEX in columns (7) to (8) and number of employees in columns (9) to (10). For each dependent variable, we include stringent fixed effects representing progressively tighter

definitions of the control group. Panel A uses the main sample, while Panel B uses only the more restrictive export controls. Of note, the coefficients are stable regardless of the degree of fixed effects saturation. The collateral damage of export controls on U.S. suppliers is both statistically and economically significant. The coefficient of column (2) in Panel A indeed suggests that export controls lead to a decline in cash flow that is equal to 20% of its average value for treated firms. Revenues for treated firms decline by 8.6% after export control, as shown in column (4). The coefficient of column (6) in Panel A suggests that export controls lead to a decline in EBIT that is equal to 25% of its average value for treated firms. Affected suppliers seem to adjust to the negative consequences of export controls by reducing employment but not investment, as shown in columns (7) to (10).

The effect on investment is only marginally significant in column (7) and becomes insignificant in column (8) once we interact the fixed effects with size quartiles. The latter is our preferred specification, especially since the literature (Whited, 1992; Warusawitharana and Whited, 2016) has documented that size—possibly as proxy for financial constraints—is an important predictor of capital expenditures. Thus, we find no robust evidence that investment is affected by export controls. On the other hand, the effect on employment is both statistically and economically significant, representing a 6.6% decline in the total number of employees (column 10). The asymmetric effect on investment and employment is consistent with the fact that export controls do not significantly change the long-term investment opportunities of the affected firms, but may require a short-term adjustment to the labor force.

Finally, we study whether affected U.S. suppliers face tighter lending conditions from U.S. banks following the imposition of export controls. To do so, we employ confidential

loan-level data from the corporate loan schedule of the Federal Reserve’s Y-14Q collection. As before, we focus on firms that export to China, resulting in a sample of 331 firms—71 of which are affected by export controls—borrowing from 38 banks from 2012:Q3 to 2023:Q3. Table 8 presents the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML, columns 1–4) and OLS (columns 5–6) regression results when considering the effects on total credit commitments, the amounts of committed term loans and credit lines, the share of the credit line that is utilized, the interest rate spread, and the maturity of total commitment, respectively. We observe a reduction in banks’ credit exposure to affected suppliers, driven by a reduction in the quantity of term loans, but no change in credit lines commitments and utilization. Banks also charge a higher interest rate spreads and shorten the maturity of their credit exposures to affected suppliers following the imposition of export controls.

A potential concern is that our results could be driven by factors other than the export controls. In a few instances discussed in Section 2, a Chinese company is added to the Entity List because it is charged with stealing intellectual property from a U.S. supplier. In those cases, the inclusion in the BIS list is concurrent with the DOJ indictment. Therefore, the stock price and the cash flow of those U.S. suppliers may be negatively affected not because of the export controls, but because of the theft of trade secrets that caused the inclusion in the BIS list (Curti et al., 2023). However, we make sure to exclude the victims of IP theft from the group of affected suppliers in our sample.¹²

¹²The U.S. victims of intellectual property theft that could also be in our treatment group are Micron, based on the inclusion of Jinhua in the Entity List, and Avago and Skyworks, based on the inclusion of ROFS Microsystems and Tianjin Micro Nano Manufacturing. We obtain this information by reading the motivations for inclusion in the Entity List and checking the DOJ website for indictments of Chinese companies regarding the theft of intellectual property.

Our results are also unlikely to be driven by the 2018-2019 trade wars in which U.S. and China engaged in retaliatory tariffs (Fajgelbaum et al., 2020; Amiti, Redding and Weinstein, 2019; Benguria and Saffie, 2023). Indeed, the broad-based tariffs did not apply to a single company but to various products and sectors. Since our estimates rely on variation within the same industry, size quartile, export status (whether or not a firm exports to China), and year, they are unlikely to be affected by broad-based tariffs. Similarly, our results also unlikely to be driven by the August 2022 CHIPS Act which provided subsidies to chip makers with U.S. operations. Indeed, the reform applies to a broad set of firms and not just to our set of affected suppliers.

4.4 Chinese Response to U.S. Export Controls

Next, we examine how Chinese firms respond to U.S. export controls, which are designed to deny them access to U.S. cutting-edge technologies. In line with our previous results we expect a decoupling from U.S. suppliers, but it is unclear whether Chinese targets are able to find alternative suppliers and, if so, from which country. Appendix Table B.1 reports the summary statistics for Chinese supply chain variables.

We first examine whether Chinese firms that are directly targeted by U.S. export controls decouple from the U.S. and whether they reshore by finding alternative suppliers domestically. Table 9 displays the results. The dependent variables are the total terminations with U.S. suppliers in columns (1) to (2), new relations formed with Chinese suppliers in columns (3) to (4), and new relations formed with U.S. suppliers in columns (5) to (6). The positive and significant coefficients of $\text{Affected} \cdot \text{Post}$ in columns (1) and (2) indicate that relations

between targeted Chinese firms and their U.S. suppliers are more likely to be terminated after the export controls relative to unaffected Chinese firms. We also find that affected Chinese firms increase new relationships with domestic Chinese suppliers in columns (3) to (4). Although the number of new relationships with U.S. suppliers does not change in a statistically significant manner after the export controls, the size of the coefficient is negative, as displayed in columns (5) to (6).

We further examine the total number of suppliers and the change in supplier shares in Table 10. The dependent variables are the total number of suppliers in columns (1) to (2), the share of Chinese suppliers in columns (3) to (4), and the share of U.S. suppliers in columns (5) to (6). The total number of suppliers of the affected Chinese firms does not change significantly after the export controls, indicating a strong substitution of new Chinese suppliers for the terminated U.S. suppliers. Indeed, the share of Chinese suppliers increases significantly in columns (3) to (4), while the share of U.S. suppliers decreases significantly in columns (5) to (6). The results indicate that Chinese firms that are directly targeted by U.S. export controls can quickly adjust their supply chain by forming new relationships with domestic Chinese suppliers, suggesting that decoupling is accompanied by reshoring for the Chinese firms targeted by U.S. export controls. It is possible that Chinese firms reshore faster and more effectively than U.S. firms hit by export controls because large state-owned Chinese firms enjoy a stronger degree of economic coordination.

In addition to forming new relations with alternative suppliers, targeted Chinese firms can also try to buy more goods similar to those denied to them by U.S. export controls from non-U.S. firms with whom they have a pre-existing relation. Notice that non-U.S. firms are

exempt from U.S. export controls, unless they have significant operations in the United States. We classify non-U.S. firms as exempt, which, if any, would bias our estimates towards finding a decline in revenues by non-U.S. firms that sell to Chinese targets. Table 11 displays the results. Non-U.S. firms that supply goods to Chinese targets experience higher revenues and profitability (measured by EBIT) following the inclusion of the Chinese targets in the U.S. export control lists, even though the effect is statistically significant only for revenues.¹³ The results are stronger when we focus on non-U.S. firms headquartered in U.S.-allied countries, likely because these firms produce high-tech products more comparable with those produced in by U.S. firms. Anecdotal evidence indeed suggest that such strategic behavior by China is taking place. Faced with controls on semiconductor technology from U.S. firms, some large Chinese firms bought similar technology from ASML in the Netherlands for years before the Dutch government restricted those exports to China as well.

In summary, we find evidence that Chinese firms respond to being subject to U.S. export controls along both the extensive and intensive margin. They form new relations with alternative Chinese suppliers and seem to increase their purchases from non-U.S. firms with whom they had pre-existing relations. Relatedly, Han, Jiang and Mei (2023) also find evidence that U.S. export controls have the unintended consequence of boosting domestic Chinese innovation as a way to be less reliant on U.S. technologies.

¹³The sample of international firms used in Table 11 relies on data from CapitalIQ. The Cash Flow measure of Table 7 is not available in CapitalIQ and thus not used in Table 11.

5 Conclusion

By forbidding U.S. firms to export to a selected list of Chinese firms for national security reasons, export controls aim to generate a selective decoupling of U.S. firms from China. We indeed show that they prompt a supply chain reconfiguration away from Chinese customers, both those targeted by export controls and those that are not. This broad-based decoupling of U.S. firms from China is not offset by the creation of new supply chain relations in other countries. Indeed, the total number of customers declines, potentially inflicting collateral damage upon the same U.S. firms whose technology export controls are trying to protect.

We indeed find that export controls impose significant collateral damage on the affected U.S. firms. We estimate a negative cumulative abnormal return of 2.5% and a decline in revenues and profitability following the introduction of Chinese customers in the export control lists. These costs ought to be weighed against the expected benefits of such measures.

Moreover, the benefits of U.S. export controls, namely denying China access to advanced technology, may be limited as a result of Chinese strategic behavior. Indeed, there is evidence that, following U.S. export controls, China has boosted domestic innovation and self-reliance, and increased purchases from non-U.S. firms that produce similar technology to the U.S.-made ones subject to export controls.

If national security is a public good, are these export controls a way to make firms internalize their negative externalities? Is it actually beneficial to penalize the same domestic firms that produce cutting-edge technologies? Some may argue that if the government forbids U.S. firms from exporting to certain foreign customers, it should indemnify those U.S. firms.

This could be achieved by boosting domestic demand for the restricted goods, in what may look like an industrial plan to reshore or friend-shore high-tech supply chains. In addition, export controls imposed by a single country, the U.S., may not have the desired effect since Chinese firms can potentially buy similar goods from non-U.S. firms. The benefits of U.S. export controls may also be diminished if they trigger an increase in domestic Chinese innovation or in IP theft. More research along the lines of Clayton, Maggiori and Schreger (2023b) is needed to better understand the costs and benefits of using economic leverage as a coercive tool in a polarized world. Many questions remain unanswered. Among the tools at our disposal, such as trade agreements, reshoring subsidies, and export controls, we do not fully understand their relative costs and benefits, or whether they should be used in a particular order.

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Figure 1: Number of Affected U.S. Suppliers. Figure 1 Panel A displays the number of affected U.S. suppliers over time as BIS includes Chinese customers on the entity list. The histogram shows the number of affected U.S. suppliers in a specific year. The blue line represents the cumulative number of affected U.S. suppliers over time. Symbolic Chinese firms that are included in the entity list are highlighted with orange text. Panel B displays the top 10 most affected industries based on the total number of affected U.S. suppliers in each industry. The industry classification is based on the 2-digit SIC code.







Figure 2: Decoupling from Chinese Customers. Figure 2 displays the dynamic effects of export controls on the number of terminated Chinese customers in affected suppliers. Panels A, C and E show the coefficient plots for the number of terminated Chinese customers using the Poisson Maximum likelihood regression (PPML) on the stacked regression of Eq. (1) while Panels B, D and F employ the TWFE model of Eq. (2). Panels A and B display the results on the total terminations with Chinese customers. Panels C and D show terminations with Chinese customers, excluding the targeted ones. Panels E and F display the results on the new relationship with Chinese customers. Regressions include firm and industry-size quartile-lagged customer number quartile-year fixed effects. In the stacked regressions, the fixed effects are further interacted with the cohort indicator variable. The blue bars indicate 95% confidence intervals around the estimated dynamic coefficient (blue dot).


Panel A: Terminations (total), Stacked




Panel B: Terminations (total), TWFE




Panel C: Terminations (excl. targeted), Stacked



Panel D: Terminations (excl. targeted), TWFE



Panel E: New relationship, Stacked



Panel F: New relationship, TWFE




Figure 3: Cumulative Abnormal Returns around Announcement Dates. Figure 3 displays the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of affected suppliers in a [-10, 20] day window around the announcement date of the inclusion of a target entity in the BIS lists. Panel A shows CARs using the Fama-French 3-factor model (Fama and French, 1993) while Panel B uses the Fama-French 5-factor model (Fama and French, 2015). On the vertical axis are the cumulative abnormal returns in percentages and on the horizontal axis the days relative to the announcement dates. The dashed vertical line represents the day before announcement date. The solid red line represents the average CARs and the dot-dash blue lines represent the 95% confidence intervals.




Figure 4: Firm variables for Affected Suppliers. Figure 4 displays dynamic effects of export controls on the firm variables of affected suppliers with the full sample of export control events. Panels A shows the coefficient plots for cash flow using the stacked regression approach of Eq. (1), while Panels B, C, D and E display the results on revenues, EBIT, capex, and employees. Regressions include cohort-firm, cohort-industry-size quartile-year. The blue bars indicate 95% confidence intervals around the estimated dynamic coefficient (blue dot).





Figure 5: Chinese Firms' Supply Chain Reconfiguration. Figure 5 displays the dynamic effects of export controls on the supply chains of Chinese firms targeted by U.S. export controls. Panel A shows the coefficient plot for the terminations with U.S. suppliers using the Poisson Maximum likelihood regression (PPML) on the stacked regression of Eq. (1) while Panel B displays the dynamic effect on new relationships with Chinese suppliers. Regressions include cohort-firm and cohort-lagged customer number quartile-year fixed effects. The blue bars indicate 95% confidence intervals around the estimated dynamic coefficient (blue dot).

Panel A: Terminations with U.S. suppliers



Panel B: New Relationship with Chinese suppliers




Table 1: Summary Statistics—Supply Chain Reconfigurations. Table 1 presents summary statistics for firms’ supply chain relationships based on their treatment status (treated if they supply to Chinese entities in the BIS lists; control if they exported to Chinese entities not in the BIS lists). Termination Chinese Cust is the total number of terminated relations with Chinese customers. Termination Chinese Cust (excl. targeted) is the total number of terminated relations with Chinese customers, excluding those targeted by the BIS lists. New Relations Chinese Cust is the number of new Chinese customers. Total Cust is the total number of customers. Domestic Cust is the number of domestic (U.S.) customers. Domestic Share is the ratio of the total number of domestic US customers to the contemporaneous number of total customers. China share is the ratio of the total number of Chinese customers to the contemporaneous number of total customers. Asia share is the ratio of the total number of customers from Asian countries other than China to the contemporaneous number of total customers. Asia Friend Share is the ratio of the total number of customers from South Korea, Japan, Australia, and Taiwan to the contemporaneous number of total customers. EU share is the ratio of the total number of customers from European Union countries to the contemporaneous number of total customers. SD refers to standard deviation, Obs to the number of observations, and p(25), p(50), and p(75) to the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles, respectively.

	Mean	SD	Obs	p(25)	p(50)	p(75)
Termination Chinese Cust	0.212	0.741	5,246	0	0	0
Treated	0.597	1.42	737	0	0	1
Control	0.149	0.531	4,509	0	0	0
Termination Chinese Cust (excl. targeted)	0.199	0.703	5,246	0	0	0
Treated	0.502	1.301	737	0	0	0
Control	0.149	0.531	4,509	0	0	0
New Relations Chinese Cust	0.447	1.308	5,246	0	0	0
Treated	1.221	2.476	737	0	0	2
Control	0.321	0.937	4,509	0	0	0
Total Cust	33.165	61.384	5,246	8	19	39
Treated	62.248	120.915	737	17	34	60
Control	28.411	42.849	4,509	7	17	36
Domestic Cust	15.417	24.89	5,246	3	9	18
Treated	24.654	44.382	737	6	14	23
Control	13.907	19.569	4,509	3	8	18
Domestic Share	0.498	0.246	5,139	0.333	0.5	0.667
Treated	0.405	0.174	733	0.3	0.395	0.5
Control	0.513	0.252	4,406	0.333	0.5	0.68
China Share	0.063	0.133	5,139	0	0.012	0.071
Treated	0.094	0.111	733	0.027	0.065	0.122
Control	0.058	0.136	4,406	0	0	0.059
Asia Share	0.182	0.187	5,139	0.025	0.143	0.269
Treated	0.234	0.169	733	0.115	0.222	0.323
Control	0.174	0.189	4,406	0	0.125	0.25
Asia Friend Share	0.152	0.178	5,139	0	0.1	0.222
Treated	0.203	0.167	733	0.078	0.167	0.294
Control	0.143	0.178	4,406	0	0.088	0.2
EU Share	0.13	0.127	5,139	0	0.111	0.19
Treated	0.136	0.099	733	0.062	0.13	0.199
Control	0.129	0.131	4,406	0	0.106	0.19

Table 2: Summary Statistics—Financial and Real Collateral Damage. Table 2 presents summary statistics for firms’ balance sheet characteristics based on their treatment status (treated if they supply to Chinese entities in the BIS lists; control otherwise) and for the cumulative abnormal returns of Treated suppliers before and after the announcement of export controls. SD refers to standard deviation, Obs to the number of observations, and p(25), p(50), and p(75) to the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles, respectively. Cash Flow equals operating income before depreciation minus interest and taxes, divided by lagged assets, Revenues is the logarithm of the total revenues (in millions), Sale is the logarithm of the total sales (in millions), ROA is return on assets, CAPEX is capital expenditures divided by lagged assets, Income equals operating income before depreciation divided by lagged assets, EBIT is earnings before interest and taxes divided by lagged assets, Interest is interest expenses divided by lagged assets, and Employees is the logarithm of the total number of employees.

	Mean	SD	Obs	p(25)	p(50)	p(75)
Balance Sheet Characteristics						
Assets, \$m	11,741	47,886	5,220	216	1,010	4,498
Treated	15,027	41,501	734	437	1,916	7,810
Control	11,203	48,835	4,486	195	887	4,066
Cash Flow	0.012	0.264	5,193	-0.008	0.075	0.123
Treated	0.084	0.128	731	0.052	0.098	0.135
Control	-0.0002	0.278	4,462	-0.025	0.069	0.119
Revenues	6.52	2.215	5,183	5.1	6.688	8.094
Treated	7.125	2.028	733	5.822	7.234	8.596
Control	6.42	2.229	4,450	4.969	6.608	8.023
Sales	6.51	2.211	5,160	5.089	6.68	8.085
Treated	7.122	2.028	731	5.822	7.183	8.601
Control	6.409	2.224	4,429	4.956	6.596	8.009
ROA	-0.04	0.272	5,219	-0.075	0.027	0.08
Treated	0.032	0.142	734	0.002	0.048	0.092
Control	-0.050	0.286	4,485	-0.096	0.023	0.077
CAPEX	0.034	0.04	5,190	0.012	0.023	0.042
Treated	0.037	0.044	731	0.013	0.024	0.041
Control	0.034	0.039	4,459	0.012	0.023	0.042
Income	0.037	0.261	5,193	0.007	0.098	0.154
Treated	0.107	0.132	731	0.073	0.122	0.165
Control	0.026	0.275	4,462	-0.013	0.093	0.151
EBIT	-0.003	0.259	5,196	-0.038	0.058	0.114
Treated	0.064	0.136	732	0.032	0.081	0.124
Control	-0.014	0.272	4,464	-0.056	0.052	0.111
Interest	0.014	0.027	4,687	0.002	0.008	0.017
Treated	0.01	0.01	672	0.003	0.008	0.013
Control	0.015	0.029	4,015	0.001	0.008	0.018
Employees	7.716	2.048	5,169	6.28	7.857	9.159
Treated	8.283	2.05	730	6.928	8.521	9.861
Control	7.623	2.033	4,439	6.207	7.716	9.06
Cumulative Abnormal Returns						
3-factor CAR						
[-10, -1]	-0.011	0.082	250	-0.053	-0.009	0.024
[0, 20]	-0.025	0.103	250	-0.081	-0.029	0.024
5-factor CAR						
[-10, -1]	-0.007	0.085	250	-0.047	-0.007	0.027
[0, 20]	-0.027	0.11	250	-0.086	-0.025	0.023

Table 3: Summary Statistics for China Exporters by Size Quartiles. Table 3 presents summary statistics for balance sheet characteristics of firms that export to China, broken down by size quartiles and treatment status (whether or not they were ever treated, namely suppliers of Chinese entities included in the BIS lists). SD refers to the standard deviation. Cash Flow equals operating income before depreciation minus interest and taxes, divided by lagged assets, Revenues is the logarithm of the total revenues (in millions), Sale is the logarithm of the total sales (in millions), ROA equals earnings before extraordinary items divided by lagged assets, CAPEX is capital expenditures divided by lagged assets, Operating Income equals operating income before depreciation divided by lagged assets, EBIT is earnings before interest and taxes divided by lagged assets, Interests to asset equals interest expense divided by lagged assets, and Employees equals the logarithm of the total number of employees.

No. Obs.	Stat. Tot.	Full	Size Q1		Size Q2		Size Q3		Size Q4	
		Sample 5,220	Treated 31	Control 247	Treated 134	Control 862	Treated 196	Control 1,440	Treated 373	Control 1,937
Assets, \$m	Mean	11,741	1,057	141	2,690	698	1,404	1,187	27,778	24,735
	Median	1,010	119	21	166	108	767	496	6,665	4,269
	SD	47,886	1,750	455	10,027	3,437	1,670	1,799	54,993	72,073
Cash Flow	Mean	0.012	-0.015	-0.286	-0.01	-0.072	0.086	-0.001	0.125	0.07
	Median	0.075	0.07	-0.083	0.028	0.018	0.088	0.066	0.115	0.088
	SD	0.264	0.294	0.645	0.183	0.332	0.074	0.225	0.069	0.148
Revenues	Mean	6.52	5.474	3.151	4.928	4.71	6.42	5.982	8.417	7.893
	Median	6.688	4.8	2.88	4.926	4.653	6.375	6.02	8.26	7.979
	SD	2.215	1.714	1.729	2.092	1.712	1.178	1.647	1.298	1.699
Sale	Mean	6.51	5.474	3.151	4.927	4.71	6.42	5.984	8.418	7.877
	Median	6.68	4.8	2.88	4.926	4.653	6.375	6.022	8.27	7.967
	SD	2.211	1.714	1.729	2.089	1.712	1.178	1.649	1.298	1.695
ROA	Mean	-0.04	-0.085	-0.319	-0.048	-0.131	0.024	-0.058	0.074	0.022
	Median	0.027	0.011	-0.125	-0.003	-0.034	0.036	0.011	0.069	0.045
	SD	0.272	0.373	0.608	0.195	0.364	0.087	0.237	0.074	0.156
CAPEX	Mean	0.034	0.063	0.031	0.035	0.037	0.037	0.038	0.035	0.03
	Median	0.023	0.026	0.018	0.024	0.024	0.026	0.027	0.023	0.021
	SD	0.04	0.107	0.049	0.04	0.046	0.044	0.041	0.035	0.031
Income	Mean	0.037	0.005	-0.262	0.004	-0.052	0.106	0.025	0.154	0.098
	Median	0.098	0.073	-0.070	0.037	0.035	0.108	0.089	0.145	0.117
	SD	0.261	0.285	0.604	0.183	0.326	0.079	0.226	0.074	0.156
EBIT	Mean	-0.003	-0.057	-0.299	-0.031	-0.094	0.06	-0.018	0.111	0.061
	Median	0.058	0.02	-0.117	0.006	-0.01	0.065	0.044	0.102	0.079
	SD	0.259	0.322	0.601	0.191	0.324	0.081	0.224	0.069	0.151
Interest	Mean	0.014	0.012	0.023	0.009	0.016	0.009	0.014	0.01	0.013
	Median	0.008	0.009	0.004	0.003	0.004	0.008	0.007	0.01	0.009
	SD	0.027	0.017	0.072	0.017	0.035	0.009	0.027	0.007	0.016
Employees	Mean	7.716	6.778	4.564	6.157	6.077	7.656	7.232	9.502	8.948
	Median	7.857	6.057	4.376	6.077	5.951	7.647	7.128	9.582	8.949
	SD	2.048	1.702	1.628	2.103	1.659	1.373	1.445	1.398	1.551

Table 4: Decoupling from China. This table presents the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) regression results of the effect of export controls on supply chain configurations. Termination Chinese Cust is the total number of terminated relations with Chinese customers. Termination Chinese Cust (excl. targeted) is the total number of terminated relations with Chinese customers, excluding those targeted by the BIS lists. New Relations Chinese Cust is the number of new Chinese customers. Affected equals one for firms that within the previous year had a customer included in the BIS lists (Entity List, UVL, and MEU list) and Post equals one after the inclusion of such customer in the BIS lists. For each cohort, the control group includes never treated and not yet treated firms. SIC refers to the 2-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) code. Size refers to the industry-specific size quartile of each firm. Custom refers to the lagged total number of customers quartile of each firm in the treatment group. We require all firms to be exporting to China in the pre-treatment period. We double cluster the standard errors at the firm and year level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

<i>Dependent variables:</i>	Termination Chinese Cust			Termination Chinese Cust (excl.targeted)			New Relations Chinese Cust		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Affected · Post	0.571*** (0.21)	0.587** (0.234)	0.697*** (0.266)	0.371* (0.224)	0.408* (0.242)	0.557** (0.267)	-0.479*** (0.139)	-0.523*** (0.153)	-0.472** (0.193)
<i>Fixed Effects:</i>									
Cohort-Firm	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cohort-SIC-Year	✓			✓			✓		
Cohort-SIC-Size-Year		✓			✓			✓	
Cohort-SIC-Size-Custom-Year			✓			✓			✓
Observations	18,375	16,034	11,337	18,266	15,960	11,267	25,294	23,221	19,000

Table 5: Supply Chain Reconfiguration—Number of customers. This table presents the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) regression results of the effect of export controls on supply chain configurations. Total Cust is the total number of customers. Domestic Cust is the number of domestic customers. Affected equals one for firms that within the previous year had a customer included in the BIS lists (Entity List, UVL, and MEU list) and Post equals one after the inclusion of such customer in the BIS lists. For each cohort, the control group includes never treated and not yet treated firms. SIC refers to the 2-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) code, and Size to the industry-specific size quartile of each firm. We require all firms to be exporting to China in the pre-treatment period. We double cluster the standard errors at the firm and year level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

<i>Dependent variables:</i>	Total Cust		Domestic Cust	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Affected · Post	-0.144** (0.064)	-0.138** (0.07)	-0.117 (0.076)	-0.098 (0.084)
<i>Fixed Effects:</i>				
Cohort-Firm	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cohort-SIC-Year	✓		✓	
Cohort-SIC-Size-Year		✓		✓
Observations	32,294	32,159	31,803	31,639

Table 6: Supply Chain Reconfigurations—Customer Share. This table presents the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) regression results of the effect of export controls on supply chain reconfigurations. Domestic Share is the ratio of the total number of domestic US customers to the contemporaneous number of total customers. China Share is the ratio of the total number of Chinese customers to the contemporaneous number of total customers. Asia Share is the ratio of the total number of customers from Asia, excluding China, to the contemporaneous number of total customers. Asia Friend Share is the ratio of the total number of customers from South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Australia to the contemporaneous number of total customers. EU Share is the ratio of the total number of customers from European Union countries to the contemporaneous number of total customers. Affected equals one for firms that within the previous year had a customer included in the BIS lists (Entity List, UVL, and MEU list), and Post equals one after the inclusion of such customer in the BIS lists. For each cohort, the control group includes never treated and not yet treated firms. SIC refers to the 2-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) code. Size refers to the industry-specific size quartile of each firm. Custom refers to the lagged number of customers in each region quartile of each firm in the treatment group. We require firms to export to China in the pre-treatment period. We double-cluster the standard errors at the firm and year level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Panel A: Domestic Share and China Share

	Domestic Share		China Share	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Affected · Post	0.081*** (0.029)	0.100** (0.033)	-0.332*** (0.075)	-0.406*** (0.122)
<i>Fixed Effects:</i>				
Cohort-Firm	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cohort-SIC-Size-Year	✓		✓	
Cohort-SIC-Size-Custom-Year		✓		✓
Observations	31,443	31,337	27,897	27,270

Panel B: Other Customer Share

	Asia Share		Asia Friend Share		EU Share	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Affected · Post	-0.028 (0.044)	-0.014 (0.038)	-0.043 (0.049)	0.003 (0.047)	-0.081 (0.06)	-0.029 (0.039)
<i>Fixed Effects:</i>						
Cohort-Firm	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cohort-SIC-Size-Year	✓		✓		✓	
Cohort-SIC-Size-Custom-Year		✓		✓		✓
Observations	29,029	28,720	29,209	27,857	27,744	27,091

Table 7: Real Effects of Export Controls. This table presents the stacked regression results of the effect of export controls on cash flow, revenue, EBIT, capital expenditure and employment. Cash Flow equals operating income before depreciation minus interest and taxes, divided by lagged total assets. Revenues is the logarithm of the total revenues (in millions), EBIT is earnings before interest and taxes divided by lagged assets, CAPEX is capital expenditures divided by lagged assets, Employees is the logarithm of the number of employees, and Affected equals one for firms that within the previous year had a customer included in the BIS lists (Entity List, UVL, and MEU list). Post equals one after the inclusion of such customer in the BIS lists. For each cohort, the control group includes never treated and not yet treated firms. SIC refers to the 2-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) code, Size to the industry-specific size quartile of each firm, and China equals one if a firm exports to China. We require all firms to be exporting to China in the pre-treatment period. We double cluster the standard errors at the firm and year level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

<i>Dependent variables:</i>	Cash Flow		Revenues		EBIT		CAPEX		Employees	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Panel A: Full Sample										
Affected · Post	-0.021** (0.007)	-0.017** (0.007)	-0.112** (0.037)	-0.087** (0.031)	-0.019** (0.007)	-0.016* (0.008)	0.006* (0.003)	0.005 (0.003)	-0.087** (0.036)	-0.069** (0.031)
Observations	32,108	32,108	32,079	32,079	32,110	32,110	32,065	32,065	31,899	31,899
Panel B: Restrictive Sample										
Affected · Post	-0.022** (0.008)	-0.017** (0.007)	-0.113** (0.038)	-0.093** (0.031)	-0.020** (0.008)	-0.016* (0.008)	0.006* (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	-0.090** (0.036)	-0.072** (0.031)
Observations	26,771	26,771	26,777	26,777	26,773	26,773	26,737	26,737	26,601	26,601
<i>Fixed Effects:</i>										
Cohort-Firm	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cohort-SIC-Year	✓		✓		✓		✓		✓	
Cohort-SIC-Size-Year		✓		✓		✓		✓		✓

Table 8: Bank Lending to Affected U.S. Suppliers. This table presents the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML, columns 1–4) and OLS (columns 5–6) regression results of the effect of export controls on bank lending. Affected equals one for firms that within the previous year had a customer included in the BIS lists (Entity List, UVL, and MEU list) and Post equals one after the inclusion of such customer in the BIS lists. For each cohort, the control group includes never treated and not yet treated firms. SIC refers to the 2-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) code. Size refers to the industry-specific size quartile of each firm. We require all firms to be exporting to China in the pre-treatment period. We double cluster the standard errors at the firm and quarter level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

<i>Dependent variables:</i>	Committed Total Credit	Committed Term Loans	Committed Credit Lines	Utilized Credit Lines	Spread	Maturity
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Affected · Post	-0.136* (0.073)	-0.630** (0.251)	-0.081 (0.068)	-0.197 (0.171)	0.179** (0.088)	-4.874*** (1.538)
<i>Fixed Effects:</i>						
Cohort-Firm	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cohort-SIC-Size-Quarter	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cohort-Bank-Quarter	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	356,012	356,012	356,012	356,012	174,368	202,016

Table 9: Decoupling from the U.S.—The Chinese Perspective. This table presents the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) regression results of the effect of export controls on Chinese firms’ supply chain reconfigurations. Termination US Supp is the total number of terminated relations with the U.S. suppliers. New Relations Chinese Supp is the number of new Chinese suppliers. New Relations US Supp is the number of new U.S. suppliers. Affected equals one for Chinese firms that within the previous year are included in the BIS lists (Entity List, UVL, and MEU list) and Post equals one after the inclusion of such firms in the BIS lists. For each cohort, the control group includes never treated and not yet treated firms. Custom refers to the lagged total number of customers quartile of each firm of the targeted Chinese firm group. We require all firms to be importing from US suppliers in the pre-treatment period. We double cluster the standard errors at the firm and year level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

<i>Dependent variables:</i>	Terminations (1)	US Supp (2)	New Relations (3)	Chinese Supp (4)	New Relations (5)	US Supp (6)
Affected · Post	0.567** (0.288)	0.533* (0.298)	0.470*** (0.180)	0.399** (0.189)	-0.206 (0.174)	-0.255 (0.187)
<i>Fixed Effects:</i>						
Cohort-Firm	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cohort-Year	✓		✓		✓	
Cohort-Custom-Year		✓		✓		✓
Observations	164,404	163,292	191,616	190,181	181,496	180,782

Table 10: Decoupling from the U.S.—Customer Shares. This table presents the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) regression results of the effect of export controls on Chinese firms’ supply chain configurations. Total Suppliers is the total number of suppliers. China Supplier Share is the ratio of the total number of Chinese suppliers to the contemporaneous number of total suppliers. US Supplier Share is the ratio of the total number of US suppliers to the contemporaneous number of total suppliers. Affected equals one for Chinese firms that within the previous year are included in the BIS lists (Entity List, UVL, and MEU list) and Post equals one after the inclusion of such Chinese firms in the BIS lists. For each cohort, the control group includes never treated and not yet treated firms. Custom refers to the lagged total number of customers quartile of each firm in the treatment group. We require all control firms to be importing from US in the pre-treatment period. We double cluster the standard errors at the firm and year level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

<i>Dependent Variables:</i>	Total Suppliers		China Supplier Share		US Supplier Share	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Affected · Post	0.064 (0.122)	0.002 (0.107)	0.302*** (0.114)	0.295*** (0.108)	-0.327** (0.135)	-0.282** (0.125)
<i>Fixed Effects:</i>						
Cohort-Firm	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cohort-Year	✓		✓		✓	
Cohort-Custom-Year		✓		✓		✓
Observations	250,368	250,368	180,707	180,647	191,090	191,090

Table 11: Supply Chain Circumvention. This table presents the regression results of the effect of export controls on the revenues and EBIT of suppliers from all regions (excluding the U.S.) and suppliers in allied regions (European Union, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Australia, Vietnam, and Canada). Revenues and EBIT are as defined in Table 7. Affect equals one for firms that within the previous year had a customer included in the BIS lists (Entity List, UVL, and MEU list) and Post equals one after the inclusion of such customer in the BIS lists. For each cohort, the control group includes never treated and not yet treated firms. SIC refers to the 2-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) code, and Size to the industry-specific size quartile of each firm in each region (Europe, Asia, etc). We require all firms to be exporting to China in the pre-treatment period. We double-cluster the standard errors at the firm and year level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Panel A: Treated firms in allied regions				
<i>Dependent variables:</i>	Revenues		EBIT	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Affected · Post	0.159*** (0.048)	0.131** (0.050)	0.006 (0.007)	0.004 (0.008)
<i>Fixed Effects:</i>				
Cohort-Firm	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cohort-SIC-Year	✓		✓	
Cohort-SIC-Size-Year		✓		✓
Observations	97,697	97,697	98,192	98,192
Panel B: Treated firms in all regions				
<i>Dependent variables:</i>	Revenues		EBIT	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Affected · Post	0.045* (0.025)	0.034 (0.023)	0.001 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)
<i>Fixed Effects:</i>				
Cohort-Firm	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cohort-SIC-Year	✓		✓	
Cohort-SIC-Size-Year		✓		✓
Observations	359,052	359,052	360,701	360,701

Online Appendix: Not For Publication

This appendix includes several sections of supplemental information. Appendix A contains definitions for the variables used in the paper and Appendix B includes additional results.

A Variable Definitions

Variable Name	Description
Terminations Chinese Cust	Total number of terminated relations with Chinese customers <i>Source: Factset Revere.</i>
Terminations Chinese Cust (excl.targeted)	Total number of terminated relations with Chinese customers, excluding those targeted by the BIS lists. <i>Source: Factset Revere.</i>
New Relations Chinese Cust	The number of new Chinese customers <i>Source: Factset Revere.</i>
Total Cust	Total number of customers. <i>Source: Factset Revere.</i>
Domestic Cust	Total number of domestic customers. <i>Source: Factset Revere.</i>
Domestic Share	Ratio of the total number of domestic U.S. customers to the contemporaneous number of total customers. <i>Source: Factset Revere.</i>
China Share	Ratio of the total number of Chinese customers to the contemporaneous number of total customers. <i>Source: Factset Revere.</i>
Asia Share	Ratio of the total number of customers from Asia, excluding China, to the contemporaneous number of total customers. <i>Source: Factset Revere.</i>
Asia Friend Share	Ratio of the total number of customers from South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and Australia to the contemporaneous number of total customers. <i>Source: Factset Revere.</i>
EU Share	Ratio of the total number of customers from the Europe Union to the contemporaneous number of total customers. <i>Source: Factset Revere.</i>
Termination US Supp	Total Number of terminated relations with the U.S. suppliers. <i>Source: Factset Revere.</i>
New Relations Chinese Supp	Number of new Chinese suppliers. <i>Source: Factset Revere.</i>
New Relations US Supp	Number of new U.S. suppliers. <i>Source: Factset Revere.</i>
Total Suppliers	Total number of suppliers. <i>Source: Factset Revere.</i>
China Supplier Share	Ratio of the total number of Chinese suppliers to the contemporaneous number of total suppliers. <i>Source: Factset Revere.</i>

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Table A.1 – *Continued from previous page*

Variable	Description
US Supplier Share	Ratio of the total number of U.S. suppliers to the contemporaneous number of total suppliers. <i>Source:</i> Factset Revere.
Assets	Total assets in \$ million (at). <i>Source:</i> Compustat.
Cash Flow	Operating income before depreciation (oibd) minus interest (xint) and taxes (txt), divided by lagged assets. <i>Source:</i> Compustat.
ROA	Earnings before extraordinary items (ib) divided by lagged assets. <i>Source:</i> Compustat.
CAPEX	Capital expenditures (capx) divided by lagged assets. <i>Source:</i> Compustat.
Income	Operating Income before depreciation (oibdp) divided by lagged assets. <i>Source:</i> Compustat.
Interest	Interest expense (xint) divided by lagged assets. <i>Source:</i> Compustat.
Employees	Logarithm of the number of employees in thousands (emp). <i>Source:</i> Compustat.
Revenues	Logarithm of the Revenues in \$ million (revt). <i>Source:</i> Compustat and Capital IQ
Sale	Logarithm of the Sale in \$ million (sale) <i>Source:</i> Compustat
EBIT	Earnings before Interest and Taxes (ebit) divided by lagged assets. <i>Source:</i> Compustat and Capital IQ
Affected	Firm that supplied goods and services to a Chinese entity within one year of its inclusion in a BIS export control list. <i>Source:</i> FactSet Revere.

B Additional Results

Table B.1: Summary Statistics of Chinese firms' Supply Chain Reconfigurations. Table B.1 presents summary statistics for Chinese firms' supply chain relationships based on their treatment status (treated if they are included the BIS lists; control if they are not in the BIS lists). Termination US Supp is the total number of terminated relations with US suppliers. New Relations Chinese Supp is the number of new Chinese suppliers. New Relations US Supp is the number of new US suppliers. Total Suppliers is the total number of suppliers. China share is the ratio of the total number of Chinese suppliers to the contemporaneous number of total suppliers. US share is the ratio of the total number of US suppliers to the contemporaneous number of total suppliers. SD refers to standard deviation, Obs to the number of observations and p(25), p(50), and p(75) to the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles, respectively.

	Mean	SD	Obs	p(25)	p(50)	p(75)
Termination US Supp.	0.202	0.498	271,345	0	0	0
Treated	0.507	0.765	211	0	0	1
Control	0.201	0.498	271,134	0	0	0
New Relations Chinese Supp.	1.253	2.576	271,345	0	0	1
Treated	2.839	3.951	211	0	1	4
Control	1.252	2.574	271,134	0	0	1
New Relations US Supp.	0.303	0.686	271,345	0	0	0
Treated	0.668	1.03	211	0	0	1
Control	0.303	0.686	271,134	0	0	0
Total Suppliers	6.824	11.265	271,345	1	2	7
Treated	14.739	16.411	211	2	7	21.5
Control	6.818	11.258	271,134	1	2	7
China Share	0.476	0.369	214,378	0	0.5	0.8
Treated	0.433	0.305	198	0.167	0.5	0.647
Control	0.476	0.369	214,180	0	0.5	0.8
US Share	0.295	0.351	214,378	0	0.157	0.5
Treated	0.352	0.305	198	0.113	0.25	0.5
Control	0.295	0.351	214,180	0	0.157	0.5

Figure B.1: Cumulative Abnormal Returns and Tighter Export Controls. Figure B.1 displays the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of affected suppliers in a [-10, 20] day window around the announcement date of the inclusion of a target entity in the most stringent BIS lists, the Entity and MEU lists. Panel A shows CARs using the Fama-French 3-factor model (Fama and French, 1993) while Panel B uses the Fama-French 5-factor model (Fama and French, 2015). On the vertical axis are the cumulative abnormal returns in percentages and on the horizontal axis the days relative to the announcement dates. The dashed vertical line represents the day before the announcement date. The solid red line represents the average CARs and the dot-dash blue line the 95% confidence intervals.

