### Discussion of:

### **Cultural Stereotypes of Multinational Banks**

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March 21, 2023

#### European Winter Finance Summit Zurs, Austria

The views expressed in this discussion are solely the responsibility of the author and should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the New York Fed or of anyone else associated with the Federal Reserve System.

## Overview

#### · Trust plays an important role in banks' portfolio choice

- Focus on how European banks allocate their government portfolio across sovereigns

#### • Two nice features of this empirical setting

- 1) Key role of trust in *sovereign* bond investment
- 2) Use publicly available EBA stress test data

#### Bank trust in a country has a positive effect on associated sovereign bond exposures

- 1) Measure bank trust using bank geographical presence & variation in cross-country trust
- 2) Effect is persistent, stronger for less diversified banks, weaker for target countries whose bonds appear more frequently in bank portfolios

 $SovExposure_{bcht} = \beta_1 TrustBias_{hc} + \beta_2 X_{hc} + \beta_3 \gamma_{bt} + \beta_4 \mu_{ct} + \epsilon_{bcht}$ 

- $\cdot\,$  Model errors likely correlated within a country-pair  $\rightarrow$  clustering
- SovExposure is a dummy "indicating any positive exposure of a bank toward a target country at time t" → extensive margin only
  - How often does entry/exit happen?

## BNP Paribas (Dec 2020 EU-Wide Tranparency Exercise)

| Residual Maturity   | Country / Region | Total gross carrying a derivative financ                     |        | Total carrying amount or<br>non-derivative financial<br>assets (net of short<br>positions) |
|---|------------------|--|--------|--|
| F 0 - 3M F<br>F 3M - 1Y F<br>F 1Y - 2Y F<br>F 2Y - 3Y F<br>F 3Y - 5Y F<br>F 3Y - 10Y F<br>F 30Y - more<br>Total | Finland          | 0<br>20<br>77<br>90<br>159<br>62<br>11                       | 419    | 0<br>0<br>23<br>36<br>105<br>8<br>0<br>172   |
| F 0 - 3M F<br>F 3M - 1Y F<br>F 1Y - 2Y F<br>F 2Y - 3Y F<br>F 3Y - 5Y F<br>F 10Y - more<br>Total                 | France           | 3.303<br>1.128<br>1.220<br>1.104<br>14.255<br>7.196<br>7.900 | 36.108 | 3,303<br>1,128<br>622<br>1,104<br>13,758<br>5,816<br>0<br><b>25,732</b>                    |
| F 0 - 3M F<br>F 3M - 1Y F<br>F 1Y - 2Y F<br>F 2Y - 3Y F<br>F 3Y - 5Y F<br>F 3Y - 10Y F<br>F 40Y - more<br>Total | Germany          | 2,966<br>765<br>1,065<br>2,787<br>3,295<br>1,506             | 13,846 | 2.716<br>765<br>1.005<br>1.425<br>407<br>0<br>1.232<br><b>7.552</b>                        |

## Banca Popolare di Sondrio (Dec 2020 EU-Wide Tranparency Exercise)

| Residual Maturity   | Country / Region | Total gross carrying amount of non-<br>derivative financial assets | Total carrying amount of<br>non-derivative financial<br>assets (net of short<br>positions) |
|---|------------------|--|--|
| F 0 - 3M F<br>F 3M - 1Y F<br>F 1Y - 2Y F<br>F 2Y - 3Y F<br>F 3Y - 5Y F<br>F 3Y - 10Y F<br>F 10Y - more<br>Total | Finland          |  |  |
| F 0 - 3M F<br>F 3M - 1Y F<br>F 1Y - 2Y F<br>F 2Y - 3Y F<br>F 3Y - 5Y F<br>F 3Y - 10Y F<br>F 10Y - more<br>Total | France           | 0<br>0<br>281<br>1<br>0<br>207<br>0<br><b>489</b>                  | 0<br>0<br>281<br>1<br>0<br>207<br>0<br>489   |
| F 0 - 3M F<br>F 3M - 1Y F<br>F 1Y - 2Y F<br>F 2Y - 3Y F<br>F 3Y - 5Y F<br>F 3Y - 10Y F<br>F 10Y - more<br>Total | Germany          |  | 1<br>5<br>2<br>2<br>0<br>0<br>0<br>0<br>0<br>1<br>1  |

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  - ! As of December 2020, BNP sovereign exposure = 0 only vis-a-vis Estonia
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- → More prominence to "intensive margin" results (now in appendix)

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  - $\rightarrow$  Estimating the coefficients basically using smaller banks and countries
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  - The exposures are gross exposures, while more meaningful exposures might be net of hedging

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| [0 - 3M [   | France           | 3.303  | 3.303  |
| [3M - 1Y ]  |                  | 1.128  | 1,128  |
| [1Y - 2Y ]  |                  | 1.200  | 622  |
| [2Y - 3Y ]  |                  | 1.104  | 1,104  |
| [3Y - 5Y ]  |                  | 14.255   | 13,758   |
| [5Y - 10Y ]   |                  | 7.196  | 5,816  |
| [10Y - more   |                  | 7.990  | 0  |
| Total   |                  | 36,108   | 25,732   |
| [0 - 3M [   | Germany          | 2.966  | 2,716  |
| [3M - 1Y ]  |                  | 765  | 765  |
| [1Y - 2Y ]  |                  | 1.065  | 1,005  |
| [2Y - 3Y ]  |                  | 1.462  | 1,425  |
| [3Y - 5Y ]  |                  | 2.787  | 407  |
| [5Y - 10Y ]   |                  | 3.295  | 0  |
| [40Y - more   |                  | 1.506  | 1,232  |
|   |                  | <b>13.846</b>  | 7,552  |

# A tighter test

· Trust measured at bank-level using country-level trust index & branch network presence

$$\mathit{Trust}_{bc} = \sum_{i} \omega_{i} \mathit{Trust}_{hc}$$

where weights are the share of host-country branches in the branch network of an international bank

#### Convincing tests about corporate culture & international presence

- More prominence to these results, e.g., managerial teams in multinational banks disproportionally come from countries where these banks have branches (now in section 6)

#### · A few concerns

- Concerns about LHS might explain why effects are stronger for bonds held less frequently and stronger for less diversified and less sophisticated banks
- Are foreign branches disproportionally in some foreign countries? A map would help a lot

## What is trust/stereotype?

- The specific question in the 1996 editions of Eurobarometer is:

*I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in people from various countries.* For each, please tell me whether you have a lot of trust, some trust, not very much trust, or no trust at all

- Is it trust?
  - Trust in people vs. trust in people as borrowers
  - Trust in the government?
  - How specific to 1996 are these survey responses?
  - $\rightarrow$  Survey as of 1996 (check time-variation in responses using previous waves)

## Two additional tests

- 1) Use M&A for identification
  - Bank A acquires Bank B  $\rightarrow$  shock to Bank A stereotypes ... but number of observations might be an issue
- 2) Banks specialize in foreign markets (Paravisini et al., JF, forthcoming)
  - Trust might just capture geographical specialization, which is not necessarily captured by bank branch presence

- Foreign credit risk exposure are in part captured in the EBA data

## Overall

- New insight in a very interesting market
  - New channel, on top of moral suasion, risk-shifting, carry trade
- Empirical concerns mostly about the source of variation on both your dependent (more concerns) and independent (less) variables

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- More prominence to the results on bank culture and geographical network