

Discussion of:

Whatever it Takes: The Real Effects of Unconventional Monetary Policy

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
Matteo Crosignani
Federal Reserve Board

Western Finance Association Meeting

Whistler, 26 June 2017

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this discussion are solely the responsibility of the author and should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System or of anyone else associated with the Federal Reserve System.

OMT in Context



The Outright Monetary Transactions Program


*“But there is another message I want to tell you. Within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do **whatever it takes to preserve the euro**. And believe me, it will be enough”*

- Allows the ECB to buy unlimited amount of govt bonds
 - Program has never been activated
 - 26 July 2012: announcement
 - 6 September 2012: release of technical details
- The goal is to “prevent divergence in short-term bond yields and ensure that monetary policy is transmitted equally to all the eurozones member economies”
- ▶ *De facto* an indirect bank recapitalization
 - Krishnamurthy et al. (2017)

Transmission of OMT to Bank Lending

- 1) OMT \Rightarrow “windfall gains” through bank govt bond holdings
 - Use EBA stress test data and market prices
 - *De facto* an indirect bank recapitalization
 - 2) Windfall gains \Rightarrow \uparrow bank credit supply to firms
 - Use DealScan and firm-level data from Amadeus
 - Positive effect only in the intensive margin
 - Positive effect only to low-quality firms (IC ratio)
 - 3) The rise of zombies
 - Zombies are distressed firms obtaining subsidized loans Caballero et al. (2008) and Giannetti and Simonov (2013)
 - Zombies firms from 4% to 12% of tot assets post-OMT
- \Rightarrow 3 hints that point at zombie lending

Zombie Lending: High- Vs. Low-Capital Banks



Windfall Gains and Bank Credit Supply

Claim: Windfall gains \Rightarrow \uparrow bank credit to firms

- Holdings of government bonds not randomly assigned
 - Especially in the eurozone periphery during the crisis
 - GIIPS banks increase holdings of domestic govt bonds
 - Acharya et al. (2016): high leverage banks risk-shift buying domestic government bonds and reducing lending to firms

\Rightarrow “Windfall” gains might just be “undercapitalization”

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta Volume_{bmt+1} &= \beta_1 \cdot OMT \text{ windfall gain}_b * PostOMT \\ &+ \gamma \cdot X_{bt} + Firm \text{ Cluster}_m \cdot Quarter\text{-}Year_{t+1} \\ &+ Firm \text{ Cluster}_m \cdot Bank_b + u_{bmt+1},\end{aligned}$$

- What if we add *Leverage* * *PostOMT*?

Transmission Channel


Claim: Windfall gains \Rightarrow \uparrow bank credit to firms

- Channel: \uparrow banks' equity capitalization and \downarrow run risk
 - ▶ Banks are liquid thanks to the LTROs but likely insolvent
- 1) Alternative Channel: Eurozone breakup risk \downarrow
 - ▶ Pre-OMT: sovereigns likely unable to bailout banks
 - ▶ Post-OMT: banks rely on govt guarantees
- 2) Alternative Channel: the risk-shifting asset changed
 - ▶ Pre-OMT: undercapitalized banks buy domestic govt bonds
 - ▶ Post-OMT: undercapitalized banks lend to risky firms

Zombie Firms and Cash Reserves

- Firm balance sheet Vs. risk-shifting channel
 - Non-zombie firms use bank credit to build up cash reserves
 - Zombie firms unable to increase cash reserves


Panel A: Cash Holdings - High Ind. OMT Windfall Gain Borrower



Zombie Firms and Leverage

- Firm balance sheet Vs. risk-shifting channel
 - Zombie firms unable to increase cash reserves
 - But zombie increase leverage...
 - Plot total assets of zombie firms

Panel C: Leverage - Decomposition for Zombie Firms



Macro Outcomes and Policy

- Default rates of zombie Vs non-zombie firms
 - In the short-term (2013-14), similar default rates
 - By 2016, 15% of zombie firms default (5% on non-zombie)
- Policy
 - Good firms suffer from zombie lending in same industry
 - Bank zombie credit explains current issues with bad loans

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- Two regional Italian lenders to be wound down



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