Discussion of:

Does a Larger Menu Increase Appetite? Collateral Eligibility and Bank Risk-Taking by Sjoerd Van Bekkum, Marc Gabarro, Rustom Irani

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Bocconi Carefin Conference

Milan, 24 October 2016

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Summary

- Question:
 - How does central bank collateral policy affect credit supply?
- ► How:
 - European Central Bank starts accepting low quality RMBS

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- Use mortgage level data from Netherlands
- Some banks are more affected than other banks (DiD)
- Results:
 - Increase share of newly accepted collateral in RMBS
 - Increase new mortgage supply
 - Reduce interest rates on mortgage originations
 - Newly issued mortgages perform worse

Empirical Setting

- ECB as a LOLR since 2008
 - Provides unlimited collateralized loans to eurozone banks
 - Accepts wide range of collateral (govt bonds, ABS, MBS)
 - Attractive haircuts and interest rate in eurozone periphery
 - RMBS rating is mapped to three classes: Class 1/2/3
- Mortgage supply in Netherlands
 - Class 2 becomes eligible in Dec11, Class 3 in Jun12
 - Since 2008 bank use retained RMBS to create liquidity
 - 2/3 of current issuance is retained
 - Banks have a technology to transform illiquid in liquid
- Data
 - Mortgage Data: Size, origination date, interest rate, LTV, location, borrower income/employment status
 - Bank-level variables
 - RMBS-level variables (rating, retained (Y/N))

1) Identification Strategy

 Rank banks according to their issuance of Class 2/3 RMBS Affected banks: above median Non-affected banks: below median

$$y_{ijklt} = \alpha_{lt} + \alpha_k + \beta A fter_t \times Treatment_k + \theta' X_{ijkt} + \epsilon_{ijklt}$$

y interest rate on new originations

i loans, *j* borrowers, *k* banks, *l* location, *t* month

- More how two groups differ along observables
- Why not using a continuous variable?
- Need to interact balance sheet characteristics with After

2) Two Shocks in December 2011


- Class 2 eligible in Dec 11, Class 3 eligible in Jun12 Before period: Jan10-Dec11 After period: Jan12-Dec13 (LTRO in Dec11!)
- 1) Laxer collateral eligibility requirement Acceptance of Class 2/3 MBSs
- 2) ECB provision of long term liquidity3-Year Long Term Refinancing Operation (Dec11-Feb12)

Which one is driving the results? LTRO data available:


- LTRO uptakes from Bloomberg
- Control for self-securitizations during LTRO allotment

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Covered Bond Issuance in Spain



Covered Bond Issuance in Italy



3) Theory

- ECB as a LOLR
 - *Before:* accepts high quality and liquid collateral
 - After: accepts high/low quality and illiquid collateral
 - Bagehot: "collateral considered safe in normal times"
- If LOLR accepts liquid colleteral
 - Effective in stopping Diamond-Dybvig runs
 - Does not free balance sheet capacity to fund projects
- If LOLR accepts low quality and illiquid colleteral
 - Frees banks' balance sheet capacity to fund projects

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At the cost of incentivizing reaching-for-yield?